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I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict at the heart of cybersquatting is in many ways conceptual.
To most of its early inhabitants, the Internet embodied a separate and
distinct environment - a territory unto itself.' As such, it was thought the
online world would stand separate from existing governmental power
structures premised on the idea of territorial sovereignty.' This
separateness placed online actors theoretically beyond the authority of
established legal systems, whose validity appeared limited by territorial
boundaries and the sovereign-subject relationships occurring in the off-line
world.3 Indeed, what many envisioned was an opportunity to create a self-
regulating community existing within the "territory" of the Internet and
built from the ground up (an ironic phrase) on the libertarian ideal.4
Of course, this desire for separateness did not blind members of the
virtual community to the eventuality of interaction with the off-line world.
The commercial potential of the network was apparent to many, if not to
established brick-and-mortar commercial interests. With this in mind, on-
line actors began to buy up the most desirable "locations" in this virtual
world - domain names corresponding either to popular generic or
descriptive terms5 or to trademarks held by commercial interests under off-
1. H. Brian Holland, The Failure of the Rule of Law in Cyberspace? Reorienting the
Normative Debate on Borders and Territorial Sovereignty, J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
(forthcoming Fall 2005) (manuscript at 4, on file with author). See also David. R. Johnson & David
Post, Law And Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
2. Holland, supra note 1, at 5.
3. Id. at 5-6.
4. Id. at 5-6, 8.
5. See Christie L. Branson, Was $7.5 Million a Good Deal for Business.com? The
Difficulties of Obtaining Trademark Protection and Registration for Generic and Descriptive
Domain Names, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 286-87 (2001) (providing
an example of the registration and sale of generic and descriptive domain names at a large profit).
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line legal regimes.6 To these speculators, the acquisition of rights in
domain names was little more than a land rush in a newly created territory,
free of encumbrances, rewarding those who were the first to act by
purchase of a claim of right.
Existing governmental power structures and the beneficiaries of that
authority saw the Internet quite differently; as an extension of the off-line
world. This network, comprised of computers and wires anchored to terra
firma, and populated by individuals located within existing real-world
borders,7 was, in their view, far from a new and independent territory, but
rather merely another medium for communication and commerce.8 Thus,
individuals could not ignore the rights and obligations imposed by virtue
of the territorial sovereign-subject relationship simply by acting in the
online environment rather than off-line.9 There could be no land rush,
because the rights in much of that "land" had already been assigned
through a system of trademark rights.
Part II of this Article describes this conflict between claims of
appropriated rights in the newly created territory of the Internet and the
mapping of rights conferred by existing territorially based trademark
systems onto Internet space. I begin with an overview of the domain name
system and the basics of cybersquatting. I then discuss the development of
remedial systems intended to address the problem, from the application of
existing trademark law and the weaknesses in that approach, to the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)' ° and the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). "
Part Il of this Article attempts to situate cybersquatting and its
remedies among trademark principles. This links two tracks of
progression. The first is the evolution of trademark principles towards
property-like exclusive rights. The second uses these principles as a
baseline to measure the extension of certain rights applicable in the context
6. See Ughetta Manzone, Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 13 BERKELEYTECHL.J.
249,250 (1998) (describing Toeppen's strategy ofregistering domain names reflecting well-known
trademarks).
7. See Lawrence Lessig, TheArchitecture oflnnovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1786, 1788-89
(2002) (describing the physical level of the Internet, comprised of material objects such as wires,
computers, and wires linking computers).
8. Holland, supra note 1, at 6-8 (discussing primarily the arguments of Jack L. Goldsmith).
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), effective Nov. 29,
1999).
11. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [hereinafter UDRP Policy]
(as adopted on Aug. 26, 1999 and approved by ICANN on Oct. 24, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/
udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
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of cybersquatting. Here, I focus on the incremental modifications in the
substantive terms of the ACPA, and then the more drastic changes
imposed in the substantive terms of the UDRP, as effectuated by
procedural and institutional biases.
In Part IV of this Article, I argue that cybersquatting remedial systems,
and in particular the UDRP, have lost touch with the basic principles upon
which they were constructed. I point specifically to the expansion of the
UDRP beyond our understanding of "cybersquatting" and into more
benign instances of domain name conflict. Connecting this to the issue of
trademark protections, I argue that the expanded rights described in Part
III do not make sense beyond the narrow confines of "traditional"
cybersquatting. Application of the UDRP to such a broad range of cases
simply cannot be justified even under the most expansive view of
property-like trademark rights. Even more importantly, the bargain at the
heart of the UDRP - sacrificing certain constitutional protections in favor
of efficiency - raises questions of validity when applied outside the most
obvious and egregious cases of bad faith and abusive domain name
registration.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYBERSQUATTING REMEDIES
The purpose of this section is to lay the groundwork for my discussion
of the relationship between the regulation of cybersquatting and basic
trademark principles. I begin with a brief overview of the domain name
system and the basics of cybersquatting. In particular, I emphasize the
roles of technical structure and consumer expectation in creating the
demand supporting a specific concept of value. I then describe the various
remedial systems for adjudicating domain name disputes, beginning with
the initial use of traditional trademark infringement and related actions,
followed by the development of both statutory and contract-based actions
created specifically to address cybersquatting.
A. Overview of the Domain Name System
The Internet is simply a linked network of computers geographically
located all over the world. 2 In order for those individual computers to
12. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (describing the Internet
as "a giant network that interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks:
a network of networks"). Apparently, finding a cohesive definition of the term "Internet" has
become a cumbersome project. See, e.g., Federal Networking Council Resolution: Definition of
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exchange data they must be able to find one another. 13 To accomplish this,
every computer linked to this network, whether a server or a user, is
assigned an Internet protocol address (IP address) that identifies network
location.' 4 IP addresses are numerical, consisting of four numbers (called
octets) separated by periods.' 5 Each of the four numbers can range from 0
to 255, allowing for 4.3 billion unique combinations. 6 Thus, a sample IP
address might be 214.37.162.82. Server IP addresses are generally "static"
in that they are assigned to that server and are the same every time the
server logs on to the network.'7 User IP addresses are generally "dynamic"
in that a new IP address may be periodically assigned by the user's
Internet Service Provider (ISP), often changing each time the user logs on
to the network.'"
A "Uniform Resource Locator" (URL) is an alphanumeric expression
that corresponds to a particular IP address. 9 A sample URL would be
<http://www.yahoo.com>. A fully qualified "domain name" is a subset of
the URL, as it generally does not include the reference to the access
"Internet" 10/24/95, at http://www.nitrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005). The
Internet is
the global information system that - (i) is logically linked together by a globally
unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent
extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent
extensions follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides,
uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered
on the communications and related infrastructure described herein.
Id.
13. See ICANN FAQs, at http://www.icann.org/faq/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2005) (building on
this analogy of location, and the ability to "find" a specific computer in a specific place, even when
that place is "virtual," by explaining that "[e]very computer on the Internet has a unique address
-just like a telephone number").
14. Id. (explaining that a computer's network address is comprised of"a rather complicated
string of numbers... called its 'IP address').
15. Understanding IP Addressing, at http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Intemet/
2002/IPaddressing.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
16. Id. IP addresses are represented in decimal rather than binary form. Id. "For example, the
IP address 168.212.226.204 in binary form is 0101000.11010100.11100010.11001100." Id.
(calculations by author).
17. IP Addresses, at http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopediaterm/0,2542,t--IP+address&I=
45349,00.asp (last visited on Oct. 4, 2005).
18. Id.
19. See URL, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/U/URL.html (last visited Oct. 4,2005).
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method (here, <http://> or hypertext transfer protocol).2" The purpose of
a domain name is to make Internet locations easier to remember by
substituting a familiar word or string of letters for the apparently random
numbers of an IP address.21
Each domain name contains several references. Many, but not all
domain names begin with a <www> reference, indicating that they are part
of the World Wide Web. 22 This is followed by the second-level domain
(also referred to as the "label") and the top-level domain (also referred to
as the "extension"), with each of these references separated by periods
(also referred to as a "dot"). 23 Thus, in this example, if the second-level
domain is <yahoo> and the top-level domain is <com>, then the domain
name is <www.yahoo.com>.
The domain name system (DNS) is a mapping mechanism that
correlates domain names to IP addresses. 24 The DNS is overseen by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).25
ICANN supervises "the distribution of unique IP addresses and domain
names" to "ensure that every address is unique" and "that each domain
name maps to the correct IP address," so that "all users of the Internet can
find all valid addresses. 26 ICANN is also responsible for accrediting
domain name registrars.27
20. See FQDN, at http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0,2542,t=-fully+qualified+
domain+name&I=43453,00.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
21. ICANN FAQs, supra note 13 (stating that "IP addresses are hard to remember" and that
domain names make "using the Internet easier by allowing a familiar string of letters ... to be used
instead of the arcane IP address"). See also id. (stating that a domain name is "a 'mnemonic' device
that makes [IP] addresses easier to remember").
22. See WWW, athttp://www.pcmag.com/encyclopediaterm/0,2542,t=www&I=54922,00.
asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
23. See Internet Domain Name, at http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopediaterm/0,2542,t =
second+level+domain&i=45215,00.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
24. See DNS, athttp://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/,2542,t=DNS&i=41620,00.asp
(last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
25. ICANN FAQs, supra note 13 (stating that ICANN "is responsible for managing and
coordinating the Domain Name System").
26. Id. "The first point of entry for resolving a domain name" is a root server. A root server
is "[o]ne of several domain name system (DNS) servers on the Internet that contain the IP addresses
of the top level domain (TLD) registry organizations that maintain the global domains (.com, .net,
.gov, etc.) and country code domains (.uk, .ca, .fr, etc.) .... [T]here are currently 34 root servers
throughout the world operated by government agencies and private organizations, all of which
contain the same data." Root Server, at http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0,2542,t-root+
server&I=50620,00.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
27. ICANN FAQs, supra note 13.
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Domain name registrars assign names on a "'first-come, first-served'
basis., 2' Registration is maintained for an annual fee and includes priority
renewal in near perpetuity.29 The registrar is required to "keep records of
the [registrant's] contact information and submit [certain] technical
information to a central directory known as the 'registry."' 30 However,
registrars do not consider the trademark significance of (or possible
infringement resulting from) a particular registration.3'
B. Cybersquatting Basics
Cybersquatting has been defined as "the deliberate, bad-faith, and
abusive registration of Internet domain names in violation of the rights of
trademark owners., 32 Usually, the cybersquatter intends to profit from the
sale of rights in the domain name at an inflated price.33 A variation on this
practice is typosquatting, "when a party registers a domain name that is
28. Scott D. Sanford, Nowhere to Run... Nowhere to Hide: Trademark Holders Reign
Supreme in Panavision Int'l, LP. v. Toeppen, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1999) (describing
the policies ofNSI, the then-dominant registrar, as registering "domain names on a 'first come, first
served' basis"); Manzone, supra note 6, at 249 (noting that the "assignment of domain names has
been structured on a first-come, first-served basis").
29. See, e.g., Network Solutions: Learn About Domain Names [hereinafter Network
Solutions] (offering a "100 year domain name service.., for domain names that you want to
protect"), at http://www.networksolutions.com/learning-center/domain-name-registrations.jhtml
(last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
30. ICANN FAQs, supra note 13.
31. Victoria Holstein-Childress, Lex Cyberus: The UDRP as a Gatekeeper to Judicial
Resolution of Competing Rights to Domain Names, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 565, 567 (2004):
Further intensifying the competition between these groups for use of particular
domain names is a lack of any effective regulatory control over domain name
registration; domain names are assigned primarily on a first-come first-served
basis by non-governmental bodies without any inquiry into potential conflicts
between the requested domain name and registered trademarks.
See also Philip G. Hampton, II & Jennifer M. McCue, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
andNumbers /Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of.1999: Dealing with Cyber-Claims,
SKI 02 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 13, 16 (2005) (stating that "Domain names are assigned without reference
to whom may be 'entitled' to it" and that "the domain name registrars are not required to confirm
that a particular registrant of a domain name has the trademark rights associated with that particular
domain name").
32. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
33. See, e.g., Cybersquatting, NetLingo.com Dictionary (stating in its definition of
cybersquatting that the "intent [of a cybersquatter] is not to develop it into a Web site but rather to
sell it to the rightful owner for a big profit"), at http://www.netlingo.com/lookup.cfm?term=
cybersquatting (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
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very close to another's trademark or name for the purpose of capitalizing
on an Internet user's typographical errors when entering a web address."34
This variation falls into the larger category of cybersquatting for the
purpose of traffic diversion, in which the cybersquatter registers a
misspelling, pluralization, or other obvious derivation of another's mark
in order to divert traffic to some web site other than the one sought by the
consumer.35 Other variations include cyberjesters and cyberzealots, parties
attempting to make humorous or political statements about the trademark
holder, and cyberpornographers (more broadly known as
cyberopportunists), parties seeking to capitalize on the goodwill of the
trademark holder to steer Internet users to pornographic web sites.36
In economic terms, the development of cybersquatting was nearly
inevitable and remarkably simple. In order to map correctly to an IP
address, a domain name must be unique.37 As a result, domain names are,
by definition, exceptionally scarce. 3' However, in the early days of the
Internet, there was little demand for domain names. As such, the rights in
a domain name could be easily and inexpensively acquired and held (or
warehoused) almost indefinitely,39 in expectation of future demand.
Eventually demand did develop primarily along two lines, both of which
are linked to consumer expectations. The first was the rapid development
of online commerce, both in terms of actual sales and mere presence. This
produced an expectation among consumers that any business of significant
size could be found online. The second was the development of a process
for navigating the Internet that placed a premium on consumer
expectations as to what domain name addresses would lead them to a
particular business. These are explored in turn.
The first influence on the demand for domain names was the rapid
development of online commerce. Although the collection of official
statistics has suffered somewhat from the application of uneven
measurement standards, U.S. Census Bureau figures provide some
estimation as to the growth of e-commerce. According to the annual "E-
Stats" report, in 1999 e-commerce transactions totaled approximately $659
billion of which $15 billion was in the form of business-to-consumer retail
34. Leonard D. DuBoff & Christy 0. King, Cyber Troubles: Resolving Domain Name
Disputes, 65-May OR. ST. B. BuLL. 33, 33 (May 2005).
35. See infra Part II(C)(2)(a) (quoting S. REP. No. 106-140; describing various forms of
cybersquatting).
36. Id.
37. See ICANN FAQs, supra note 13.
38. See Holstein-Childress, supra note 31, at 567 (noting that "a domain name is both global
and unique").
39. See, e.g., Network Solutions, supra note 29.
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sales.4 ° Just four years later, in 2003, e-commerce transactions had grown
to approximately $1.7 trillion, with business-to-consumer retail sales
accounting for $106 billion of that total.4 These statistics certainly provide
some measure of consumer expectation, but they do not tell the entire
story. Consumers quickly came to expect some sort of Internet presence,
even without the ability to consummate on-line transactions. Thus, while
only 34% of the Fortune 500 companies had web sites in 1996, that
number had grown to 80% by 1997.42 Just 2 years later, in 1999, nearly
every one of the top one hundred Fortune 500 companies had a corporate
web site.43
The second influence on the increased demand for domain names was
the development of a process of online navigation largely driven by
consumer expectation, coupled with intuition, situational biases, and
cumulative trial and error. This approach has been encouraged by minimal
search costs, increasingly more accurate results, and the perceived lack of
more efficient alternatives.' For example, if a user is looking for a
traditional, well-known off-line company on the Internet, most users
simply take a stab at it, guessing that Microsoft software can be found at
<microsoft.com> and that Target department stores can be found at
<target.com>.45 In those instances they would be right on both counts. But
what if the user turns out to be wrong? Frustration in failing to quickly find
40. See United States Department of Commerce: 1999 E-Stats (Mar. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/papers/1 999/1999estatstext.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
41. See United States Department of Commerce: 2003 E-Stats (May 11, 2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/papers/2O03/2003finaltext.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
42. Erin M. Davis, The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior: An Application to Employers'
Liability for the Computer or Internet Crimes Committed by Their Employees, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 683, 687 (2002).
43. Erick D. Prohs, Periodic Financial Report - A Relic of the Past?, 27 J. CORP. L. 481,
489 n.63 (2002).
44. This maybe changing as search methods become more accurate and discerning, and more
efficiently embedded in the user interface. See, e.g., John Battelle, The Birth of Google, WIRED,
Aug. 2005 (describing the basic theory of Google's search method), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l 3.08/battelle_pr.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
45. Holstein-Childress, supra note 31, at 567 (positing that "Internet users tend to intuit web
addresses of the companies they seek by merely entering the corporate name followed by a generic
top level domain (gTLD) such as <.com>"); id. at 570 (observing that "A domain name that
incorporates a particular mark facilitates the ability of the intuitive Internet browsing individual to
locate a web site devoted to the trademark holder's enterprise"); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W.
Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing a process of navigation
in which "Oftentimes, an Internet user will begin by hazarding a guess at the domain name,
especially if there is an obvious domain name to try. Web users often assume, as a rule of thumb,
that the domain name of a particular company will be the company name followed by '.com."').
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the correct web site can easily result in diversion.46 For instance, if I am
flying from Orlando to San Francisco I might first try
<www.northwest.com>, but I will not find Northwest Airlines, as I might
expect." Instead, I will find myself at a travel web site promoting Oregon,
Washington, and British Columbia, with no sign of Northwest Airlines.4"
But if I choose <www.southwest.com>, I head straight to Southwest
Airlines and will likely buy my ticket there.49 In the absence of actual
knowledge, consumer expectations - incorporating knowledge derived
from the off-line world, intuition, situational biases, etc. - will continue
to drive online navigation. If a business is not located where I expect it to
be, I may well go elsewhere.50
In the mid- to late-1990s, certain individuals foresaw the commercial
potential of the Internet, the tendency towards expectation-driven
navigation, and the value that such expectation created in domain names
that are exceptionally scarce. Joe Toeppen was one of those individuals.5"
Early on, Toeppen registered hundreds of domain names, many of which
were trademarks.52 He then offered to sell them to the highest bidder,
regardless of whether that person was the trademark holder or its chief
rival.53 This upset many trademark holders, and made Joe Toeppen the
poster child for cybersquatting. The question for trademark holders was
how to gain control of these domain names by (a) utilizing existing laws
and (b) seeking the passage of new or revised laws or contract-based
regulations.
C. Cybersquatting Remedial Systems
In the mid-1990s, there was no law that specifically prohibited or
imposed liability for cybersquatting. Accordingly, when the practice first
appeared, attorneys were forced to cast about to find some existing legal
principle that could put an end to the practice. Trademark law seemed the
46. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777, 780-81 (2004) (discussing the role of mistake, diversion, and
frustration in on-line trademark disputes).
47. See Northwest.com, at http://www.northwest.com/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2005) (linking to
a travel-oriented web site claiming the title of "gateway to the beautiful Pacific Northwest"). See
also Holstein-Childress, supra note 31.
48. Northwest.com, supra note 47.
49. See Southwest Airlines, at http://www.southwest.com/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
50. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 46.
51. Manzone, supra note 6, at 250-51 (describing Toeppen's cyber-speculating activities).
52. Id.
53. Id.
[Vol. 10
2005] TEMPEST IN A TEAPOT OR TIDAL WAVE? CYBERSQUA TTING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES RUN AMOK 311
logical choice, and indeed it was the most successful. However, it was not
ideal.54 In this section, I provide an overview of early attempts to utilize
traditional trademark infringement and dilution actions to combat
cybersquatting. I then discuss the development of two coexistent remedial
devices aimed specifically at cybersquatters, the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy.
1. Early Trademark Actions
The first attempts to dislodge cybersquatters utilized traditional
trademark and related actions: direct trademark infringement and unfair
competition, dilution, and secondary liability (contributory infringement
and vicarious liability).55 However, the fit between these established
actions and the "wrong" of cybersquatting was not particularly
comfortable and the corresponding results for trademark holders, although
not entirely unsuccessful, were nevertheless disappointing. 56 Indeed, these
lackluster results ultimately led to the establishment of alternate regulatory
regimes specifically applicable to cybersquatting. However, the principles
established in these early cases remain pertinent to the resolution of other
domain name disputes. A brief overview of these initial actions is therefore
helpful in any evaluation of remedial alternatives in other types of domain
name disputes.
Direct infringement under section 32 of the Lanham Act requires proof
of(a) ownership of the mark, (b) use of the mark in (interstate) commerce,
and (c) likelihood of confusion between the mark and the defendant's
allegedly infringing use.57 An allegation of unfair competition under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act58 will usually accompany a section 32
claim but will also fail if the section 32 claim is unsuccessful.59 In the
54. See Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 17 (stating that "Classic trademark theories,
such as infringement and dilution, are largely ineffective in preventing cybersquatting.").
55. See generally Jennifer Golinveaux, What 's in a Domain Name? Is "Cybersquatting"
Trademark Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 641,654-55 (1999) (providing a relatively early, but post-
FTDA look at efforts to pursue cybersquatters under existing trademark actions).
56. Id. at 657.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2005). See, e.g., Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check Point Software
Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 279 (3d Cir. 2001); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 294 (D.
N.J. 1998).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1999).
59. This linkage arises from a common and elemental foundation. See J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHYON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1 (4th ed. 1996) (noting
that "While issues of priority, secondary meaning, assignment, and the like, may be present in some
cases, the test of likelihood of confusion is the touchstone of trademark infringement as well as
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context of cybersquatting, the "use" requirement poses the greatest hurdle
to a successful direct infringement claim.
The use requirement encompasses two distinct elements.6" The first is
jurisdictional, addressing Congress's power to legislate matters affecting
interstate commerce - the constitutional authority invoked as the premise
for federal regulation of trademarks.6 The second is a matter of
substantive law, as sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act expressly
require "use in commerce" by the defendant as an element of direct
infringement.62 Both aspects of the use requirement can be very difficult
to establish in a cybersquatting case.
Courts have ruled that the creation and maintenance of an Internet web
site satisfies the jurisdictional use requirement, because the network over
which that web site is made available utilizes interstate phone lines and
similar technologies.63 However, merely registering and warehousing a
domain name without establishing a related Internet web site does not
satisfy the jurisdictional use requirement.' This raises difficult issues for
the trademark holder, because for most cybersquatting purposes no web
site is required.65 It is the registrant/cybersquatter's rights in the domain
name, and his ability to transfer those rights, that make cybersquatting
profitable, not the existence of a corresponding web site.'
The substantive use requirement can also pose problems in
cybersquatting cases. A direct infringement claim requires use in
unfair competition"). But see David J. Kera & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., United States: The Fifty-
Fifth Year ofAdministration ofthe Lanham TrademarkAct of1946, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 197, 365
(2003) (discussing two recent cases that present "useful reminders that a finding of unfair
competition can lie even if accompanying claims for infringement fail.").
60. See, e.g., Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. I11. 1996) (an early
case of cybersquatting, suggesting the two aspects of use in commerce).
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1434
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "The 'use in commerce' requirement of the Lanham Act is a
jurisdictional predicate to any law passed by Congress").
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 14(1)(a) (2005), 1125(a)(1) (1999).
63. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1434 (indicating that the jurisdictional use requirement is met,
in part, because Internet users "must use interstate telephone lines to access [a] web site on the
Internet"). See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952) (stating that "The
Lanham Act ... confers broad jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the United States," thus
effectuating the statutory "intent ... to regulate commerce within the control of Congress")
(internal quotations omitted).
64. See generally Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 307 (D. N.J. 1998) (finding
that the "mere registration of a domain name, without more, is not a 'commercial use' of a
trademark").
65. See infra Part II(C)(2)(a) (quoting S. REP. No. 106-140) (describing various forms of
cybersquatting, several of which do not require a web site).
66. Id.
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commerce as a trademark; that is, "in connection with ... the sale, ...
distribution, or advertisement of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive. ' A domain name may, depending upon its function, constitute
either actionable trademark use or non-infringing, non-trademark use. The
distinction here is between the domain name's technical function as an
indication of network location and its potential to function as an identifier
of the source of goods or services." Direct infringement requires that the
domain name serve the latter function 69 and that such use is likely to
confuse.7" Therefore, where no web site is established, trademark use is
absent.7' Likewise, where a web site is entirely unrelated to the sale,
distribution, or advertisement of goods or services, trademark infringement
can usually not be found, although, some courts will cast an extremely
wide net to find such a relationship.72
However, even if a trademark holder pursuing a cybersquatter is able
to satisfy the use requirements, she may well run into additional
difficulties in proving likelihood of confusion, albeit to a lesser extent.
One of the most troublesome factors73 for trademark holders tends to be
67. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a).
68. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc. 985 F. Supp. 949,956 (C.D. Cal.
1997), aff'd by 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that "Domain names present a special
problem under the Lanham Act because they are used for both a non-trademark technical purpose,
to designate a set of computers on the Internet, and for trademark purposes, to identify an Internet
user who offers goods or services on the Internet.").
69. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining a "trademark" as a "word, name,
symbol, or device" used, inter alia, "to indicate the source of the goods").
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 14(1)(a), 1125(a)(l)(A) (1999).
71. See generally Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 95 7 (indicating that the act of registration
is not itself trademark use).
72. See id. at 956 (stating that "Domain names, like trade names, do not act as trademarks
when they are used merely to identify a business entity; in order to infringe they must be used to
identify the source of goods or services."). See also id. at 957 (citing Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. High
Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933 (D.D.C. 1985), for the proposition "that property rights in a
trademark do not extend to the use of the trademark to express ideas unconnected with the sale or
offer for sale of goods or services"); Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 17 (stating that the
Lanham Act "requires use or an intention to use the infiinged mark in commerce and [that] several
courts have held that the infringer must be using the mark on goods or services that would be
confused with the goods or services upon which the registrant is using the mark").
73. The likelihood-of-confusion analysis is generally undertaken by weighing various factors.
See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). The eight
Polaroid factors are: (1) strength of the trademark; (2) similarity of the marks; (3) proximity of the
products and their competitiveness with one another; (4) evidence that the senior user may "bridge
the gap" by developing a product for sale in the market of the alleged infinger's product; (5)
evidence of actual consumer confusion; (6) evidence that the imitative mark was adopted in bad
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similarity of the goods and competitive proximity.74 In analyzing this
factor, many courts consider the web sites themselves to be the good in
question, rather than the products or services offered on the web site.75
Thus, the court will examine the defendant's web site and the plaintiff s
web site (perhaps speculating what the plaintiff s web site would look like
if it is not yet in existence) to determine similarity. 6 Where a
cybersquatter's web site is largely unrelated to the business of the
trademark holder, this will weigh against a finding of likelihood of
confusion.17 However, with the advent of the initial-interest-confusion
doctrine, the content of the web site tends to take a back seat to the
similarity between the mark and the domain name, particularly if they are
identical.78
Actions under the federal dilution statute, found in § 43(c) of the
Lanham Act, have been more successful in cybersquatting cases, although
the trademark holder may encounter some of the same difficulties present
in direct infringement actions.79 The primary benefit of a dilution action
is that, unlike direct infringement, it does not require the plaintiff to show
likelihood of confusion or competition between the parties as does direct
faith; (7) respective quality of the products; and (8) sophistication of consumers in the relevant
market. Id. See also AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
74. Outside of the Internet context, this factor implicates two related inquiries. The first looks
at the products themselves. The second looks at the markets and channels of trade in which those
products appear. The larger inquiry blends elements. On the Internet, as applied to domain names,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to cut the question so finely. Is the good, the domain name, the web
site, the content of the web site, or the products sold there? Is the market defined by potential
customers for the product you define or all Internet users who might navigate to that particular
domain name?
75. See, e.g., Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1235 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
76. Id.
77. See generally AMF, Inc., 599 F.2d at 351 (observing that similarity of trademarks are
"tested on three levels: sight, sound and meaning").
78. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1066 (9th
Cir. 1999).
79. The issue of "use" is particularly troublesome:
[T]he mere act of registering the domain name, without any actual use of the
domain name in a web site or e-mail address, and without an offer to sell the
address, may not be enough to trigger the anti-dilution statutes. Simply registering
the name is probably not "commercial use" of the domain name.
Hampton & McCue, supra note 3 1, at 17.
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infringement.8" Instead, it is enough to show that the defendant's use
lessens "the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods
or services."81 However, this apparently lower standard does not make
dilution entirely successful against cybersquatters. First, dilution is only
applicable to a select group of marks, those that are "famous" and
"distinctive." 82 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that
§ 43(c) requires proof of actual dilution,83 although this was generally not
required during the height of the cybersquatting problem. Third, as with
a direct infringement action under §§ 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a
dilution action still requires that the trademark holder prove use in
commerce as a trademark,8 4 raising the difficulties discussed above. 5
Finally, the dilution statute requires that the defendant's use be
"commercial,"86 and interpretation of this requirement has been somewhat
uneven.
The final obstacle facing trademark holders in the pursuit of
cybersquatters is the problem of personal jurisdiction.87  Many
cybersquatters reside abroad.88 Their only contact with the United States
is that they own rights to a domain name that under the law of the United
States allegedly infringes the trademark of another.89 In such instances, it
becomes extremely difficult to establish the minimum contacts required to
80. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,429 (2003) (noting that "Neither the
absence of any likelihood of confusion nor the absence of competition, however, provides a defense
to [a] statutory dilution claim").
81. Id. at 433; see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2005) (providing a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered
in determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous for the purposes of dilution).
83. Cf Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433, with Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 17 (stating that
"in light of the recent Supreme Court pronouncement that to prevail under the [federal dilution
statute], a party must prove actual dilution, it is even less likely that cybersquatting can be
successfully stopped under that act").
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
85. See supra Part II(C)(1).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
87. See Andrew J. Grotto, Due Process and In Rem Jurisdiction Under the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 2 COLuM. SCI. &TECH. L. REv. 1,5-6 (2001) (describing
the jurisdictional issues preceding and motivating, in part, the passage of the ACPA, including the
rejection of in rem jurisdiction in existing trademark actions).
88. See id. at 6-9 (discussing domain name registration as sufficing for minimum contracts
with forum jurisdication). See also Jinku Hwang, Is the ACPA a Safe Haven for Trademark
Infringers? - Rethinking the Unilateral Application of the Lanham Act, 22 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER& INFO. L. 655, 655-56 (2004) (describing the issue of cybersquatters residing abroad).
89. Hwang, supra note 88, at 655.
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gain personal jurisdiction over the cybersquatter.9 ° Furthermore, in rem
jurisdiction has been found impermissible in actions under §§ 32, 43(a),
and 43(c).9' Additionally, some cybersquatters actively seek to obscure
their identity, making them impossible or extremely expensive to pursue.92
This hurdle has often proven insurmountable.
Not surprisingly, having failed in many cases to gain redress from the
cybersquatters, trademark holders sought relief from the domain name
registrars. 93 A full discussion of these efforts is not pertinent to this Article.
it is enough to say that actions against registrars based on various theories
of vicarious liability, as well as those based in tortuous interference with
business relationships, were unsuccessful. 94
2. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
In response to trademark holder concerns, the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) was enacted in the fall of 1999.9' The
ACPA added § 43(d) to the Lanham Act to expressly provide a civil
remedy against cybersquatting, 96 and in doing so addressed many of the
issues discussed previously. In passing the ACPA, Congress leveraged the
modicum of success trademark holders had achieved using the dilution
90. See Grotto, supra note 87, at 6-9 (describing "The Jurisdictional Quagmire" implicated
by domain name disputes, particularly in the case of foreign defendants).
91. See id. at 7-8 (discussing, inter alia, the decision in Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc. v.
Porsche.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va. 1999), rev'don other grounds, Porsche Cars ofN. Am.,
Inc. v. AllPorsche.com, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000)).
92. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999) (noting in the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on
the ACPA that a "significant problem faced by trademark owners in the fight against cybersquatting
is the fact that many cybersquatters register domain names under aliases or otherwise provide false
information in their registration applications in order to avoid identification and service of process
by the mark owner").
93. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648, 656
(N.D. Tex. 2001) (rejecting a claim under the Texas state anti-dilution statute, primarily because
registration of a domain name does not constitute either use of a mark or intent to profit from the
mark).
94. See id. at 655-56.
95. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), effective Nov. 29,
1999).
96. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 2 (1999) (finding that "[a]mendments to the Trademark Act of
1946 would clarify the rights of a trademark owner to provide for adequate remedies and to deter
cyberpiracy and cybersquatting").
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statute against cybersquatters, but made some important changes to make
it easier for trademark holders to prevail.97
The ACPA requires a showing that the defendant, with bad intent to
profit, registered, trafficked in, or used a domain name that (a) if a mark
is distinctive, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark, or (b) if the
mark is famous, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark.9 8 The ACPA applies equally to registered and unregistered marks
and without regard to the goods or services of the parties. 9 The statute
includes a non-exclusive list of nine factors to be considered in the
determination of "bad faith intent,"'" but provides a safe harbor upon a
showing that the defendant believed and had reasonable grounds to believe
that the use of the domain name was fair use or otherwise lawful.'0'
Remedies available under the ACPA include an order compelling the
forfeiture or transfer of a domain name or cancellation of the
registration; 0 2 statutory damages between $1,000 and $100,000 per
domain name (in lieu of actual damages or profits);0 3 and injunctive relief
and damages as otherwise available under the Lanham Act.'" The ACPA
also provides a solution to the problem of jurisdiction.'0 5 If a trademark
holder cannot get personal jurisdiction over, or cannot with due diligence
find, the registrant, then the statute provides for in rem jurisdiction over
the domain name itself.0 6 However, in such cases, remedies are statutorily
97. See Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 26 (stating that "the ACPA eliminates many
substantive and jurisdictional problems that trademark owners were facing in trying to adapt
trademark law to the cybersquatting situation").
98. 15 U.S.C. § l125(d)(1)(A).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
101. Id. § 1 125(d)(l)(B)(ii). This safe harbor has, however, often been stringently applied. See
Hampton & McCue, supra note 3 1, at 28 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that "a defendant who acts even
partially in bad faith cannot benefit from the safe harbor provisions of the ACPA").
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (2004).
104. Id.
105. See Hwang, supra note 88, at 656 (stating that the in rem provisions of the ACPA "made
all the debates on personal jurisdiction useless").
106. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(d)(2); see also Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 28 (stating that
in enacting the ACPA "Congress... attempted to alleviate one of the main difficulties in bringing
suit against a cybersquatter, obtaining personal jurisdiction, by providing for in rem jurisdiction").
A trademark owner may pursue this option in two scenarios: (1) if the registrant
is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum, such as when the cybersquatter
is located in a foreign country; or (2) when the trademark owner cannot locate the
registrant through due diligence, such as when incomplete or inaccurate
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limited to an order compelling the forfeiture or transfer of the domain
name or cancellation of the registration.107
Substantively, the ACPA differs from direct infringement and dilution
actions in at least six important ways. First, the ACPA broadens the
definition of cybersquatting beyond that developed in prior case law." 8
Second, the ACPA eliminates the use-in-commerce requirement applicable
to both direct infringement and dilution actions."°9 Third, the ACPA omits
the commercial-use requirement found in the federal dilution statute."0
Fourth, the ACPA establishes bad faith as a necessary element of
liability,'1 ' rather than just one factor among many, and focuses the bad
faith inquiry (in accord with these first three distinctions) on the broad
notion of the registrant's intent to profit through the mere registration,
trafficking, or use of a domain name.' Fifth, the ACPA asks whether a
domain name is "identical or confusingly similar" to the plaintiff's mark'
and not whether the parties' domain names are likely to be-confused." 4
information was provided to the registrar. However, a plaintiff cannot proceed
under both in rem and in personam jurisdiction, since it is not possible to prove
in personam jurisdiction while also proving its absence for in rem jurisdiction.
Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted). See also Hwang, supra note 88, at 657-58 (noting that "in rem and
inpersonam jurisdiction are mutually exclusive in the ACPA," and that "the mark owner [asserting
an action in rem] must bear the burden of demonstrating the absence of in personam jurisdiction
over an alleged infringer"). Proceedings in rem must generally be filed in the judicial district in
which the domain name registrar or registry is located:
[P]laintiffs seeking to bring an in rem action against a domain name owner must
bring the case in the domain name registrar's judicial district, and cannot just
bring the action in any district they want. However, an in rem action does not
require minimum contacts by the domain registrant, only that the registrar be
located in the judicial district.
Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 29 (citations omitted). See also Hwang, supra note 88, at 658
(reporting that "Courts have held that in rem jurisdiction lies only in the judicial district where the
registrar, registry, or other authority is located as specified in § 1125(d)(2)(A)").
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(I).
108. See infra Part II(C)(2)(a).
109. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d); see also S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999).
110. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d); see also S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
112. Id. § 1 125(d)(l)(B)(i)(V) - (VIII).
113. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
114. The Eighth Circuit has, as Hampton and McCue note, recently addressed this distinction:
That the domain name be confusingly similar to the mark is another requirement
of the ACPA. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004), the
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Sixth, unlike the federal dilution statute, which applies only to marks that
are both famous and distinctive, the ACPA applies to marks that are either
famous or distinctive' 1 5 (whether such distinctiveness is inherent or
acquired through use). However, the ACPA provides broader protection
for famous marks than it does for non-famous but distinctive marks." 6
Two of these distinctions - the broadening of the definition of
cybersquatting and the emphasis on a registrant's bad faith intent to profit
warrant additional comment.
a. Conceptions of Cybersquatting
Congress made clear that the ACPA was intended to apply to at least
four conceptions of cybersquatting, including those situations in which
someone other than the trademark holder registers a domain name:
[1] Some register well-known brand names as Internet domain
names in order to extract payment from the rightful owners of the
marks, who find their trademarks "locked up" and are forced to pay
for the right to engage in electronic commerce under their own
brand name. 7 [2] Others register well-known marks as domain
District Court upheld a preliminary injunction against Purdy prohibiting him from
using domain names confusingly similar to plaintiff's. The court stated that the
question under the ACPA is not whether the domain names are likely to be
confused with a plaintiff's domain name, but whether they are identical or
confusingly similar to a plaintiff's mark. It is the challenged domain name and the
plaintiff's mark which are to be compared. The inquiry under the ACPA is thus
narrower than the traditional multifactor likelihood of confusion test for trademark
infringement. The fact that confusion about a website's source or sponsorship
could be resolved by visiting the website is not relevant to whether the domain
name itself is identical or confusingly similar to a plaintiff's mark.
Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 30.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
116. Compare id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I), with id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
117. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999). The Senate Report cited the following example:
[S]everal years ago a small Canadian company with a single shareholder and a
couple of dozen domain names demanded that Umbro International, Inc., which
markets and distributes soccer equipment, pay $50,000 to its sole shareholder,
$50,000 to an Internet charity, and provide a free lifetime supply of soccer
equipment in order for it to relinquish the "umbro.com" name. The Committee
also heard testimony that Warner Bros. was reportedly asked to pay $350,000 for
the rights to the names "warner-records.com", "warner-bros-records.com",
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names and warehouse those marks with the hope of selling them to
the highest bidder, whether it be the trademark owner or someone
else." 8 [3] In addition, cybersquatters often register well-known
marks to prey on consumer confusion by misusing the domain name
to divert customers from the mark owner's site to the
cybersquatter's own site, many of which are pornography sites that
derive advertising revenue based on the number of visits, or "hits,"
the site receives. "9  [4] Finally, and most importantly,
"warner-pictures.com", "warner-bros-pictures", and "wamerpictures.com". Id.
(footnotes omitted).
118. Id. The Senate Report cited the following example:
[T]he Committee heard testimony regarding an Australian company operating on
the Internet under the name "The Best Domains," which was offering such domain
names as "911 porsche.com," at asking prices of up to $60,911, with a caption that
reads "PORSCHE: DO I NEED TO SAY ANYTHING?" The Committee also
heard testimony regarding a similarly enterprising cybersquatter whose partial
inventory of domain names - the listing of which was limited by the fact that
Network Solutions will only display the first 50 records of a given registrant -
includes names such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Burger King, KFC, McDonalds,
Subway, Taco Bell, Wendy's, BMW, Chrysler, Dodge, General Motors, Honda,
Hyundai, Jaguar, Mazda, Mercedes, Nissan, Porsche, Rolls-Royce, Saab, Saturn,
Toyota, and Volvo, all of which are available to the highest bidder through an
online offer sheet.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
119. Id. The Senate Report cited the following example:
[T]he Committee was informed of a parent whose child mistakenly typed in the
domain name for "dosney.com," expecting to access the family-oriented content
of the Walt Disney home page, only to end up staring at a screen of hardcore
pornography because a cybersquatter had registered that domain name in
anticipation that consumers would make that exact mistake. Other instances of
diverting unsuspecting consumers to pornographic web sites involve malicious
attempts to tarnish a trademark owner's mark or to extort money from the
trademark owner, such as the case where a cybersquatter placed pornographic
images of celebrities on a site under the name "pentium3.com" and announced
that it would sell the domain name to the highest bidder. Others attempt to divert
unsuspecting consumers to their sites in order to engage in unfair competition. For
example, the business operating under the domain name "disneytransportation.
com" greets online consumers at its site with a picture of Mickey Mouse and
offers shuttle services in the Orlando area and reservations at Disney hotels,
although the company is in no way affiliated with the Walt Disney Company and
such fact is not clearly indicated on the site. Similarly, the domain name address
"wwwcarpoint.com," without a period following "www", was used by a
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cybersquatters target distinctive marks to defraud consumers,
including to engage in counterfeiting activities.
21
The first and second of these conceptions essentially involve arbitrage
or blackmail (depending upon your point of view) of the trademark owner,
although these do not strictly implicate common notions of trademark
infringement. The third conception appears to encompass two distinct
principles, depending upon the identity of the registrant. One is firmly
embedded in the foundations of trademark law. The other lurks in the
shadows, as a manifestation of expansive trademark protections. If the
registrant is a competitor of the trademark holder, then an act of
cybersquatting may constitute classic diversion of trade. If the registrant
is not a competitor of the trademark holder, then it looks more like an
attempt to leverage the goodwill of a well-known brand. The fourth
conception is simply the bait-and-switch of counterfeit goods.
b. Bad Faith
As to the ACPA's emphasis on a registrant's bad faith intent to profit,
the statute provides a list of nine non-exhaustive factors to be considered
in making this determination.' 2' The first four of these factors speak to
evidence demonstrating an absence of bad faith:
cybersquatter to offer a competing service to Microsoft's popular Carpoint car
buying service.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
120. Id. at 9. The Senate Report cited the following example:
[T]he Committee heard testimony regarding a cybersquatter who registered the
domain names "attphonecard.com" and "attcallingcard.com" and used those
names to establish sites purporting to sell calling cards and soliciting personally
identifying information, including credit card numbers. We also heard the account
of a cybersquatter purporting to sell Dell Computer products under the name
"dellspares.com", when in fact Dell does not authorize online resellers to market
its products, and a similar account of someone using the name
"levis501 warehouse.com" to sell Levis jeans despite the fact that Levis is the only
authorized online reseller of its jeans. Of even greater concern was the example
of an online drug store selling pharmaceuticals under the name
"propeciasales.com" without any way for online consumers to tell whether what
they are buying is a legitimate product, a placebo, or a dangerous counterfeit.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
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(1) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the
person, if any, in the domain name;
(ii) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal
name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly
used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or
services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark
in a site accessible under the domain name .... 12
The next four factors, on the other hand, address evidence
demonstrating the existence of bad faith:
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain
name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark,
either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the
site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for
financial gain without having used, or having an intent to
use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods
or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern
of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of the
domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain
accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly
similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of
registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous
marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of
such domain names, without regard to the goods or services
of the parties... "'
122. Id.
123. Id.
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The final factor - "the extent to which the mark incorporated in the
person's domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous
within the meaning of subsection (c)(1) of this Section" 124 - merely
incorporates the limited application of dilution into the determination of
bad faith. This provides broader protection for marks that are "more"
famous or "more" distinctive.
3. ICANN Arbitration and the UDRP
Shortly after the enactment of the ACPA, ICANN approved the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), 125 an administrative regime
applicable to certain domain name disputes, as well as the Rules governing
the implementation and application of the policy (UDRP Rules). 126 The
UDRP is incorporated by reference into all registration agreements entered
into by ICANN-accredited registrars,127 including those administering the
.com, .org, and .net gTLDs (generic top-level domains), as well as many
others. 128 Registration of a domain name utilizing any of these gTLDs thus
places a limited contractual obligation on registrants to participate in
ICANN's UDRP administrative dispute-resolution procedures. 29
Remedies under the UDRP are limited to "the cancellation of [the
registrant's] domain name or the transfer of [the] domain name registration
to the complainant."' 13 In many cases,' however, these limited remedies
are balanced by the expedited nature of the proceeding, the ease of
124. Id. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(i)(IX).
125. See UDRP Policy, supra note 11.
126. ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [hereinafter UDRP
Rules] (as adopted on Aug. 26, 1999 and approved by ICANN on Oct. 24, 1999), at http://www.
icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
127. ICANN FAQs, supra note 13.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(i). "Transfer is, by far, the most common remedy."
UDRP Opinion Guide: Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School [hereinafter
UDRP Opinion Guide], Remedies, Topic 1.9.1 (Comment), at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
udrp/opinion/index.html. See also id. (Reporter's Notes) (citing WIPO/D2000-0019 for the
proposition that UDRP panels lack "jurisdiction to order anything else than cancellation or transfer,
even if law found applicable in accordance with Rule 15(a) provides for other remedies").
131. As of June 15, 2003, more than 7,000 domain name disputes had been decided in the
UDRP system, "compared with only a few hundred cases in national courts during that same
period." Laurence R. Heifer, Whither the UDRP; Autonomous, Americanized, or Cosmopolitan?,
12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493,494-95 (2004). This disparity may be largely explained by
the fact that the UDRP "system's speed, low cost and automaticity have made it overwhelmingly
popular with trademark owners - far more popular than litigation." Id.
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electronic filing,'32 and the relatively minimal expense.'33 That said,
proceedings under the UDRP do not prevent either party, registrant or
complainant, from pursuing traditional litigation, as the UDRP expressly
provides for submission "to a court of competent jurisdiction for
independent resolution before [a UDRP] proceeding is commenced or after
such a proceeding is concluded."'34
Under Policy 4(a), a UDRP proceeding is triggered when a third-party
Complainant alleges that: "(i) your domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
complainant has rights;'35 and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests
132. See UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, In-Person Hearings, § 1.7.9.1 (noting that
under the UDRP "There shall be no in-person hearings (including hearings by teleconference,
videoconference, and web conference), unless the Panel determines, in its sole discretion and as an
exceptional matter, that such a hearing is necessary for deciding the Complaint").
133. "The cost for filing a complaints and electing one arbitrator is $1,500," DuBoff& King,
supra note 34, at 35, while "the cost of a three-member panel is $4,000," id. at 35 n.4. However,
the cost may rise as the number of domain names at issue increases. Id.
134. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 1 4(k). See also Second Staff Report on Implementation
Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, posted Oct. 25, 1999 [hereinafter ICANN
Second StaffReport], available athttp://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
Except in cases involving "abusive registrations" made with bad-faith intent to
profit commercially from others trademarks (e.g., cybersquatting and
cyberpiracy), the adopted policy leaves the resolution of disputes to the courts...
and calls for registrars not to disturb a registration until those courts decide. The
adopted policy establishes a streamlined, inexpensive administrative dispute-
resolution procedure intended only for the relatively narrow class of cases of
"abusive registrations." ... [T]he policy's administrative dispute-resolution
procedure does not extend to cases where a registered domain name is subject to
a legitimate dispute (and may ultimately be found to violate the challenger's
trademark).... The policy relegates all "legitimate." disputes - such as those
where both disputants had longstanding trademark rights in the name when it was
registered as a domain name - to the courts; only cases of abusive registrations
are intended to be subject to the streamlined administrative dispute-resolution
procedure.
Id. 4.1(c). See also UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Effect of Court Proceeding,
§ 1.7.14.1 (a) (stating that "In the event of any legal proceedings initiated prior to or during an
administrative proceeding in respect of a domain-name dispute that is the subject of the Complaint,
the Panel shall have the discretion to decide whether to suspend or terminate the administrative
proceeding, or to proceed to a decision.").
135. UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Applicable Disputes, Topic 1.1.1(i)-(ii). "A
complainant must have a trademark or service mark to bring a UDRP action. Domain name holders
cannot initiate a UDRP action against a trademark owner." Id. Topic 1.1.1 (Comment).
"Registration of a domain name before a complainant acquires trademark rights in a name does not
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prevent a finding of identity or confusing similarity... [h]owever it can be difficult to prove that
the domain name was registered in bad faith as it is difficult to show that the domain name was
registered with a future trademark in mind." WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected
UDRP Questions [hereinafter WIPO Overview], Question 1.4 (consensus view), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/search/overview/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005). But see
UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Timing of Rights in the Mark, § 2.1.4.1 (The complainant
must "have rights in a mark . . . before the disputed domain name is registered."). "If the
complainant owns a registered trademark then it satisfies the threshold requirement of having
trademark rights." WIPO Overview, supra, Question 1.1 (consensus view). Seealso UDRP Opinion
Guide, supra note 130, Federally Registered Marks, § 2.1.1.1 (stating that "Federal registration of
a mark is prime facie evidence of Complainant's rights in the mark"). "The location of the
registered trademark and the goods and/or services it is registered for are irrelevant when finding
rights in a mark." WIPO Overview, .upra, Question 1.1 (consensus view). See also UDRP Opinion
Guide, supra note 130, Foreign Registered Marks, § 2.1.1.2 (stating that "Foreign registrations of
marks can establish a Complainant's rights in a mark"). Generally, "[i]t is not the province of the
UDRP to review the validity of [trademark] registrations issued by national governments." id.
Validity of Trademark Registration, Topic 1.4.5. However, "[i]n certain, highly limited
circumstances, a panel may examine the circumstances of trademark registration to determine
whether the registration satisfies UDRP requirements," WIPO Overview, supra, Question 1.1.
"Trademark registrations that are automatic or unexamined... may not always be owed the same
deference as examined registrations." Id. "Registration in the Supplemental Register is not
sufficient," although it may be if complainant "also show[s] secondary meaning." UDRP Opinion
Guide, supra note 130, Federally Registered Marks, § 2.1.1.1 (Reporter's Notes) (citing
WIPO/D2002-1103). But see id. (citing WIPO/DBIZ2002-0167 for the proposition that
"Registration in the Supplemental Register might even prove that no rights existed at the time of
registration"). In some cases, "State registration may establish Complainant's rights in a mark,
especially where the parties are from the same geographic area or where the mark has acquired
secondary meaning beyond the original state." Id. State Registered Marks, § 2.1.1.3. There is a split
as to whether "[p]ending trademark or service mark applications can be used to help establish rights
in a mark." Id. Pending Applications, § 2.1.1.4. See also id. (Comments and Reporter's Notes).
Likewise, there is a split as to whether unregistered marks provide a basis for Complainant's rights
in a mark, where "[p]anelists from non-common law systems may require registration of the mark
in order to establish rights in the mark." UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Unregistered
Marks, § 2.1.2.1 (Comments). Where the existence of common law trademark rights is considered,
panels tend to focus on evidence demonstrating sufficient and continuous use of the mark in
commerce, as well as secondary meaning. See generally id. Existence ofCommon Law Trademark,
Topic 1.43, Establishing a Common Law Trademark, Topic 1.44, Unregistered Marks, § 2.1.2.1.
Other evidence of a common law trademark includes:
[ 1 ] Advertising, marketing, or promotional use of the alleged common law mark,
[2] Third Party references to the alleged common law mark, [3] Widespread
evidence of recognition among Internet users, [4] Sales of services under and by
reference to the alleged common law mark, [and 5] Appropriate showing of prior
continuous use in a given product and territorial market over a sufficiently long
period of time.
Id. Establishing a Common Law Trademark, Topic 1.4.4; see also WIPO Overview, supra,
Question 1.7 (consensus view). "Panels generally find rights in the names of well-known
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in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your domain name has been
registered and is being used136 in bad faith." 137
The UDRP requires that "the complainant must prove that each of [the]
three elements" required under UDRP Policy 4(a) "are present,' ' 38 and
must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.139 However, the language
and structure of Policy 4(c) has resulted in debate as to the proper
evidentiary relationship between the complainant's prima facie case under
Policy 4(a)(ii) and the respondent's rebuttal, particularly regarding shifting
burdens of proof. If the complainant makes a prima facie showing as to
Policy 4(a)(ii), then it is clear that the respondent must address the list of
circumstances evidencing one's rights to and legitimate interests in the
domain name, as set forth in Policy 4(c). 14 ° The question concerns
precisely what burden is shifting under this arrangement: "Some decisions
individuals and celebrities, based on having trademarked the name or through common law
trademark protection." UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Celebrity Names, § 2.1.2.2. See also
WIPO Overview, supra, Question 1.6. Panels are less likely to transfer the domain where the
domain is a personal name that is not well-known, absent evidence that the name was used
commercially and had acquired secondary meaning." UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Other
Personal Names, § 2.1.2.3. See also WIPO Overview, supra, Question 1.6. "Panels are divided as
to whether trade names qualify as a mark under 4(a)(i)." UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130,
Trade Names, § 2.1.2.4. "A geographical name will satisfy 4(a)(i) if it is registered as a trademark
and might satisfy 4(a)(i) if it performs functions similar to a registered trademark." Id.
Geographical Names, § 2.1.2.5. See also WIPO Overview, supra, Question 1.5 (consensus view)
(citing as a consensus view that some geographical terms "can be protected under the UDRP, if the
complainant has shown that it has rights in the term and that the term is being used as a trademark,"
although "[n]ormally this would require the registration of the geographical term as a trademark");
id. (stating that "It is very difficult for the legal authority of a geographical area to show
unregistered trademark rights in that geographical term on the basis of secondary meaning").
Certain panels have read 4(a)(i) to include "rights in Complainant's domain name where the
domain name functions as a common law trademark," UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130,
Complainant's Domain Name, § 2.1.2.6; Patent Rights, § 2.1.2.7; Radio Call Letters, § 2.1.2.8.
136. "Within the element of bad faith, debate exists as to whether the domain must be
registered and used in bad faith or whether either bad faith registration or bad faith use is
sufficient." UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Burden of Proof, § 1.3.1.1 (Comment).
137. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(a)(iii); UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130,
Applicable Disputes, Topic 1.1.1 (iii).
138. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(a); UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Burden of
Proof, § 1.3.1.1.
139. UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Burden of Proof, § 1.3.1.1 (Comment). The
preponderance standard requires "that a fact is proved when it is more likely than not that the fact
is true." Id. "The burden of proof is not satisfied by a mere showing of suspicion." Id. (Reporter's
Notes) (citing WIPO/D2000-0067). But see id. (Reporter's Notes) (citing WIPO/D2000-0847 for
the proposition that "Generally, the appropriate standard in these proceedings is preponderance of
the evidence; however in other jurisdictions other standards may apply.").
140. See id. Burden Shifting, § 1.3.2.1 (Comments); id. Burden Shifting, § 4.1.2.1.
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state that the burden of proof shifts while others maintain that it is not the
burden of proof but rather the burden of production that shifts., 141 That
debate may be dampened, however, by the World Intellectual Property
Organization's (WIPO) 142 recent recognition of a consensus view that:
While the overall burden of proof rests with the complainant ... a
complainant is [merely] required to make out an initial primafacie
case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests. Once
such prima facie case is made, respondent carries the burden of
demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. If
the respondent fails to do so, a complainant is deemed to have
satisfied paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the UDRP.143
UDRP arbitrators are not required to apply a particular substantive
law,'" but simply to follow the Policy and associated UDRP rules. 4 5 Nor
141. Id. Burden Shifting, § 4.1.2.1 (Comment).
142. WIPO has been the dominant provider of UDRP service. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A.
Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services - An Empirical Re-Assessment of
ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L. REv. 285, 335 (2005). According
to the statistics provided:
Between January 2000 and June 2003, the UDRP has evaluated 8,549 cases, and
most of them have been divided among two main providers, NAF and WIPO....
WIPO and NAF have decided 95.5% of the cases. The closest competitor, with
just 3.3%, eRes, is no longer a provider for the UDRP regime. Id. at 335.
Since the disappearance of eResolutions, WIPO and NAF have continued to divide up the market
for UDRP resolution services. In 2003, "WIPO received 50% of the cases, NAF 46%, CPR 1.6%
and ADNDRC 2%. At this time, the system seems to have reached equilibrium with two main
providers receiving an almost similar quantity of cases." Id. at 338.
143. WIPO Overview, supra note 135, Question 2.1 (consensus view).
144. See Holstein-Childress, supra note 3 1, at 580-81 (stating that "the UDRP itself neither
requires panelists to apply the law of any particular nation, nor sets forth any choice of law
guidelines for panelists)"; id. at 581 (describing the UDRP as "conferring broad discretion upon
panelists to apply a hodge-podge of governing law"); Hampton & McCue, supra note 3 1, at 21
(stating that "The arbitrators of UDRP disputes hail from all over the globe and bring widely
differing understandings of substantive trademark law as well as procedural issues, such as burdens
of proof'); id. (stating that "the arbitrators are not required to follow any particular substantive
body of law in reaching their decisions or to view previous arbitration decisions as precedent"). But
see DuBoff& King, supra note 34, at 35 (stating that "The substantive law applied by the arbitrator
is determined by the contract between the registrar and the respondent").
145. See Holstein-Childress, supra note 3 1, at 580-81 (stating that "the UDRP itself neither
requires panelists to apply the law of any particular nation, nor sets forth any choice of law
guidelines for panelists)"; UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Applicable Law Under Rule
15(a), § 1.7.11.1 (stating that UDRP panels are to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements
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are the arbitrators bound by precedent,146 although some measure of
consistency is encouraged:
The UDRP does not operate on a strict doctrine of precedent.
However panels consider it desirable that their decisions are
consistent with prior panel decisions dealing with similar fact
situations. This ensures that the UDRP system operates in a fair,
effective and predictable manner for all parties.'47
This lack of binding (or even strongly influential) precedent, together with
ambiguity regarding the substantive law to be applied in a particular
case,148 creates heightened uncertainty and a certain amount of reluctance
on the part of some to utilize the UDRP.
149
These same factors also make it somewhat difficult to summarize the
state of UDRP analysis and application. Thus, in the remainder of this
section I will highlight those issues most relevant to the later discussion of
trademark law and to show where consensus, such as it is, seems to be
headed. This process is certainly aided by the recent release of the "2005
Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions"'5 ° (WIPO
2005 Overview). However, WIPO continues to caution - as do many
practitioners - that UDRP panels are not bound by this "informal
overview" and "discussion."''
and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and
principles of law that it deems applicable").
146. See Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 21 (stating that "the arbitrators are not required
to follow any particular substantive body of law in reaching their decisions or to view previous
arbitration decisions as precedent").
147. WIPO Overview, supra note 135, Question 4.1 (consensus view).
148. See Holstein-Childress, supra note 31, at 581 (footnotes omitted):
While some panelists apply the law of the country in which the parties are
domiciled, others either merely apply the law of the panelists' country of origin or,
more commonly, refuse to consider any nation state's law in favor of resolving the
dispute exclusively in accordance with the UDRP rules.
149. See Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 21.
150. See WIPO Overview, supra note 135.
151. Id.
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a. Confusing Similarity1 5
According to the WIPO 2005 Overview, the "test for confusing
similarity should be a comparison between the trademark and the domain
name to determine the likelihood of confusion."' 53 As this statement
suggests, the UDRP's "identical or confusingly similar" standard appears
to involve an "analysis of the same factors that govern a trademark
infringement lawsuit's finding of likelihood of confusion.' 54 However,
there appears to have been some inconsistency in its application,
particularly as to the relevance of web site content in the comparative
analysis.'55 Nevertheless, the WIPO 2005 Overview asserts that a
consensus has emerged adopting the view that the "content of a website
(whether it is similar or different to the business of a trademark owner) is
irrelevant in the finding of confusing similarity:"' 5 6 the trademark and the
domain name are simply all that matter. This view is premised on the
notion of "initial interest confusion," borrowed from trademark theory,
"where a potential visitor does not immediately reach their site after typing
a confusingly similar domain name, and is then exposed to offensive or
commercial content."' 57 This suggests that content need not be commercial
in nature to support the initial interest confusion rationale, but rather that
"offensive" content is reason enough.
WIPO's disregard for "offensive" content - often defined as that
which is merely critical or derogatory of the trademark owner - is
evidenced when the "identical or confusingly similar" analysis ignores
web site content and focuses instead on a comparison between the
trademark and the domain name. In the case of what are commonly known
152. This section does not address the issue of identity between the domain name and the
complainant's mark. The following general rules are noted, however: "A domain name will be
considered identical even where Respondent deleted spaces between the words that form
Complainant's mark," UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Spacing, § 2.2.1.1; "where
Respondent merely added a gTLD to the Complainant's mark," id. TLDs, § 2.2.1.2; and "where
Respondent merely added or deleted punctuation," Id. Punctuation, § 2.2.1.3.
153. WIPO Overview, supra note 135, Question 1.2 (consensus view).
154. DuBoff& King, supra note 34, at 35.
155. Cf UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Beyond Comparing the Mark and the Domain
Name, § 2.2.3.1 (observing that "[s]ome panels look beyond the mark and the domain name when
assessing confusing similarity, including the use of the mark on the website, the fame of the mark,
whether Complainant and Respondent operated in similar lines of business, and other factors"),
with id. § 2.2.3.1 (Comment) (stating that "a large number of Panels have held that any analysis
beyond whether the actual mark and domain name are identical or confusingly similar is
inappropriate").
156. WIPO Overview, supra note 135, Question 1.2 (consensus view).
157. Id.
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as "sucks" or "gripe" sites, the WIPO 2005 Overview reports the majority
view that:
A domain name consisting of a trademark and a negative term is
confusingly similar to the complainant's mark. Confusing similarity
has been found because the domain name contains a trademark and
a dictionary word; or because the disputed domain name is highly
similar to the trademark; or because the domain name may not be
recognized as negative; or because the domain name may be viewed
by non-fluent English language speakers, who may not recognize
the negative connotations of the word that is attached to the
trademark.'58
Only a minority of panels have disagreed and found that a "domain name
consisting of a trademark and a negative term is not confusingly similar
because Internet users are not likely to associate the trademark holder with
a domain name consisting of the trademark and a negative term."'59
Consistent with the apparent tendency towards a broad view of
trademark rights, the majority of UDRP panels have generally found that
what might be charitably characterized as de minimus differences between
the domain name and the complainant's mark are insufficient to overcome
confusing similarity. This includes, for example: "Adding, deleting, or
substituting letters or numbers"; 160 "reversing the words in Complainant's
mark"; '61 or "Adding a word to Complainant's mark.",1 62
158. Id. Question 1.3.
159. Id.
160. UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Adding, Deleting, or Substituting Letters or
Numbers, § 2.2.2.2.
161. Id. Reversing the Words in a Mark, § 2.2.2.3.
162. Id. Adding a Work to a Mark, § 2.2.2.4. One study has identified the following maxims:
"Panels are even more likely to find confusing similarity where the word added relates to
Complainant's business," Id. § 2.2.2.4 (Comment); "Adding an Internet related term will not
preclude a finding of confusing similarity," Id. Internet Related Term Added, § 2.2.2.5; "Addition
of a geographical term will not preclude a finding of confusing similarity," Id. Geographical Term
Added, § 2.2.2.6; "Addition of a TLD will not preclude a finding of confusing similarity," UDRP
Opinion Guide, supra note 130, TLDs, § 2.2.2.7; "Changing the punctuation will not preclude a
finding of confusing similarity," Id. Punctuation, § 2.2.2.8; "Combining marks will not preclude
a finding of confusing similarity," Id. Combining Marks, § 2.2.2.9; and "Incorporating less than
Complainant's entire mark will not preclude a finding of confusing similarity," Id Incomplete or
Abbreviated Marks, § 2.2.2.10. Other commentators have reported that a:
WIPO arbitration panel has.., found confusing similarity in cases where the
disputed domain name: Is phonetically identical or similar to complainant's mark;
Is a translation or transliteration of the famous mark; Gives an overall impression
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b. Bad Faith
By its terms, UDRP Policy 4(a)(iii) is clearly conjunctive, requiring
that the complainant prove both that the "domain name has been registered
and is being used in bad faith.''163 However, UDRP Policy 4(b), which
provides a non-exhaustive"6 list of circumstances that "shall be evidence
of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith,"1 65 is termed in
the disjunctive:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you
have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name
registration to the complainant who is the owner of the
trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that
complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your
documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the
domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the
owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the
mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you
have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
of similarity to the famous mark; Merely adds a prefix to a famous mark;
Combines a famous mark with a geographical term; or Is a combination of famous
marks.
Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 22-23 (citations omitted).
163. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(a)(iii).
164. Id. 4(b). The following have been identified as some of the factors
WIPO arbitration panels consider . . . to determine whether, in fact, the
registration of a domain name was done in bad faith: Offer to sell, rent or license
to complainant; Offer to sell, rent or license to general public; Offer to sell, rent
or license for more than "out of pocket" costs; Pattern of conduct by respondent;
Disruption of competitors business; Attracting internet users and then
automatically hyperlinking to other sites, i.e. pornography or competitor's sites;
Giving of false contact information; Speculation in domain names; Inconceivable
legitimate use; Prior knowledge or notice of the mark; Disclaimer; Prior
relationship between parties; Acquiescence of mark owner; Cease and desist
letters.
Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 24-25.
165. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(b) (emphasis added).
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(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted
to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web
site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of
confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or
location or of a product or service on your web site or
location. 166
This construction has led to both debate and inconsistency in panel
decisions, making resolution of this issue particularly vexing to
practitioners.
ICANN's position at the outset seemed clear, as addressed by the
ICANN Second Staff Report in 1999:
Several comments (submitted by INTA and various trademark
owners) advocated various expansions to the scope of the definition
of abusive registration. For example ... These comments suggested
that the definition should be expanded to include cases of either
registration or use in bad faith, rather than both registration and use
in bad faith .... While that argument appears to have merit on
initial impression, it would involve a change in the policy adopted
by the Board. The WIPO report, the DNSO recommendation, and
the registrars-group recommendation all required both registration
and use in bad faith before the streamlined procedure would be
invoked. Staff recommends that this requirement not be changed
without study and recommendation by the DNSO.167
Nevertheless, panel opinions have been inconsistent. Some panels have
required that the complainant prove just one of the four circumstances
identified in UDRP Policy 4(b), 168 while other panels have required that
166. Id.
167. See ICANN Second Staff Report, supra note 134, § 4.5.
168. See UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, The and/or Debate, § 3.1.1.2.1 (Comments).
[S]ome Panels will cite one or more of the registration related circumstances OR
the use related circumstance, then claim that 4(a)(iii) is satisfied because 4(b)
states that the circumstances are evidence of "of the registration and use of the
domain name in bad faith." Instead of reading the language of 4(b) to mean that
three of the circumstances listed are evidence of bad faith registration while one
of the circumstances listed is evidence of bad faith use and therefore, a
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the complainant prove at least one of the first three circumstances related
to the act of registration and the fourth circumstance related to the use.'69
Despite the controversy, the 2005 WIPO Overview fails to address the
issue and it remains somewhat unsettled.
As to what type of evidence may serve as the basis for a finding of bad
faith, the WIPO 2005 Overview offers just two examples. The first is a
consensus view that "[e]vidence of offers to sell the domain name in
settlement discussions is admissible under the UDRP, and is often used to
show bad faith," primarily under UDRP Policy 4(b)(i).17 The second is a
Complainant should prove at the least one of the first three circumstances PLUS
the fourth circumstance, some Panels interpret 4(b) to mean that any one of the
circumstances listed in 4(b) would, by itself, be sufficient for both bad faith
registration and bad faith use.
Id. "[Other] Panels... have determined that, under certain circumstances, non-use or passive use
of a domain may be evidence of bad faith. Thus . . . in effect, determin[ing] that bad faith
registration alone is sufficient." Id.
169. See id.
Those that interpret Policy Section 4(a) to require proof of both registration and
use base their reasoning on statutory interpretation and general concepts of
trademark law. They argue (a) the language of Section 4(a)(iii) language is clear
despite the fact that the Section 4(c) examples are somewhat confusing; (b) the
"legislative history" of the UDRP (Section 4.5 of the Second Staff Report on
Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy) discusses
the and/or debate and flatly rejects to change the "and" to an "or"; [c] Trademark
law itself does not ordinarily find infringement in the absence of active
commercial use as evidenced by the US Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (15 USC 11 25(d)(1)(A)(i) which specifically requires additional indication of
a bad faith "intent to profit;" (d) trademark law does not grant a mark owner
worldwide exclusive rights in a name nor should the UDRP. The UDRP should
only be invoked when there is a specific intent to harm the mark owner (as all the
bad faith examples indicate). Mere registration of a single domain name simply
does not prove any of these elements.
Id.
170. WIPO Overview, supra note 135, Question 3.6. WIPO offers the following rationale for
this position:
This is because many cybersquatters often wait until a trademark owner launches
a complaint before asking for payment and because panels are competent to decide
whether settlement discussions represent a good faith effort to compromise or a
bad faith effort to extort. Also the legal criteria for showing bad faith directly
specifies that an offer for sale can be evidence of bad faith.
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consensus view that the circumstances as cited in UDRP Policy 4(b)(ii) -
a pattern of conduct of preventing a trade or service mark owner from
reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name - can be evidenced
by "a single case where the respondent has registered multiple domain
names which are similar to known trademarks, [although] the registration
of two domain names in the same case is not generally sufficient to show
a pattern.""'
Some commentators have identified a more exhaustive list of what
panels have considered as evidence of bad faith. Much of this evidence
directly reflects the circumstances set forth in UDRP Policy 4(b),
including the inference of bad faith from the registrant's "non-use of the
domain or ... the absence of legitimate use,"'172 or the registrant's use of
the domain "to link to other sites or ... otherwise divert[] or redirect[]
Internet traffic.' ' 173 Other evidence cited by commentators is less direct,
such as the provision of false contact information; 174 respondent's breach
of contract or other agreement with complainant; 175 failure to perform a
trademark search; 176 failure to respond to a cease-and-desist letter; 7 7 use
171. Id. Question 3.3.
172. UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Bad Faith Registration Inferred from Non-Use,
§ 3.1.1.3.11. It should be noted that "Panels have frequently determined that passive use satisfies
the use requirement." Id. Passive Use, § 3.1.2.1.
173. Id. Linking to Other Site, § 3.1.1.3.13. The UDRP Opinion Guide provides an analysis
of what evidence has been used to satisfy the various provisions of UDRP Policy 4(b). See id.
Circumstances Under Which an Intent to Sell may be Inferred, § 3.2.1.1.1, Circumstances Under
Which an Intent to Sell was not Inferred, § 3.2.1.2.1 (listing evidence of an intent to sell under
UDRP Policy 4(b)(i)); Id. Mark Owner is Prevented, §§ 3.2.2.1.1, 3.2.2.1.2, Pattern of Conduct,
§ 3.2.2.2.1 (listing evidence of preventing of a mark owner from reflecting his mark under UDRP
Policy 4(b)(ii)); Id. § 3.2.2.2.2 (listing evidence of a pattern of conduct based on a scheme or plan
to target under UDRP Policy 4(b)(iii)); UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130,
Competitor/Competition § 3.2.3.1.1, Disruption, § 3.2.3.1.2 (listing evidence of disruption of a
competitor's business); Id. What Constitutes Use? § 3.2.4.1, What Constitutes Commercial Gain,
§ 3.2.4.2, What Constitutes a "Likelihood of Confusion"?, § 3.2.4.3, Circumstances Satisfying
4(b)(iv), § 3.2.4.4 (describing commercial use and listing evidence of an attempt to attract
commercial gain by creating a likelihood of confusion). The UDRP Opinion Guide also provides
an analysis of what evidence has been used to refute a claim of bad faith. See id. Respondent's
Domain Name, § 3.1.1.4.1, Use of Generic or Descriptive Term, § 3.1.1.4.2.
174. Id. False Contact Information, § 3.1.1.3.3.
175. Id. Breach of Contract or Agreement, § 3.1.1.3.4.
176. Id. Failure to Perform Trademark Search, § 3.1.1.3.6.
177. UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, Failure to Respond to a Cease and Desist Letter
or Other Communications, § 3.1.1.3.15.
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of complainant's mark in metatags;'78 registration of a well-known
mark;179 registration of a misspelling or other variation of complainant's
mark (typosquatting); 8 ' and even registration of a domain that is identical
or confusingly similar to complainant's non-famous, not-well-known mark
if the registrant knew of that mark. 8'
The WIPO 2005 Overview affirms many of these interpretations, albeit
in a somewhat mitigated form, providing the following consensus view:
The lack of active use of the domain name does not as such prevent
a finding of bad faith. The panel must examine all the
circumstances of the case to determine whether respondent is acting
in bad faith. Examples of circumstances that can indicate bad faith
include complainant having a well-known trademark, no response
to the complaint, concealment of identity and the impossibility of
conceiving a good faith use of the domain name. Panels may draw
inferences about whether the domain name was used in bad faith
given the circumstances surrounding registration, and vice versa. 182
Other notable provisions of the WIPO 2005 Overview include a consensus
view that "a disclaimer cannot cure bad faith,"'83 and a recognition that
bad faith may be found in some cases where the domain name is registered
before the trademark is even established. 84
178. Id. Use of Complainant's Mark in Metatags, § 3.1.1.3.16 (comments). "Panels
occasionally find that the use of metatags falls under Paragraph 4(b)(iii) of the Policy (disruption
of a competitor's business)." Id.
179. Id. Registration of Well-Known Mark, § 3.1.1.3.7.
180. Id. Typosquatting (Misspellings or Variations on a Mark), § 3.1.1.3.14.
181. Id. Registration of a Domain that is Identical or Confusingly Similar to a Mark Known
to Respondent (That is not Necessarily Famous or Well-Known), § 3.1.1.3.9.
182. WIPO Overview, supra note 135, Question 3.2.
183. Id. Question 3.5. The following rationale and caveat are provided: "A disclaimer can also
show that the respondent had prior knowledge of the complainant's trademark. However a
disclaimer is sometimes found to support other factors indicating good faith or legitimate interest."
Id.
184. Id. Question 3.1. The consensus view acknowledges that, "[n]ormally speaking, when a
domain name is registered before a trademark right is established, the registration of the domain
name was not in bad faith because the registrant could not have contemplated the complainant's
non-existent right." Id. However, the following caveat is provided:
In certain situations, when the respondent is clearly aware of the complainant, and
it is clear that the aim of the registration was to take advantage of the confusion
between the domain name and any potential complainant rights, bad faith can be
found. This often occurs after a merger between two companies, before the new
JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW& POLICY
c. Rights and Legitimate Interests
Consistent with the structure of UDRP Policy 4(a), the complainant
must make at least a prima facie showing that the registrant has "no rights
or legitimate interests [in respect of the domain name]." '' m  If the
complainant is successful, then the burden shifts to the registrant to show
one of three circumstances evidencing one's rights to and legitimate
interests in the domain name, as provided in UDRP Policy 4(c):'86
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or
demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a
name corresponding to the domain name in connection with
a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have
been commonly known by the domain name, even if you
have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to
trademark rights can arise, or when the respondent is aware of the complainant's
potential rights, and registers the domain name to take advantage of any rights that
may arise from the complainant's enterprises.
Id.
185. Id. Question 2.2 (consensus view). It has been observed that "since it is difficult to prove
a negative (i.e., that Respondent lacks any rights or legitimate interests in the mark) ...a
Complainant's initial burden on this element is light." UDRP Opinion Guide, supra note 130, What
Must a Complainant Prove Under Paragraph 4(a)(ii), § 4.1. 1.1 (Comments).
186. WIPO Overview, supra note 135, Question 2.2 (consensus view). At the extreme end,
a registrant's failure to show one of the four circumstances in UDRP Policy 4(c) may result in a
finding that the registrant lacks a legitimate interest in the domain name, "even if it is a domain
name comprised of generic word(s)." Id. The WIPO 2005 Overlook describes the analysis in such
a case as follows:
Factors a panel should look for when determining legitimate use would include the
status and fame of the mark, whether the respondent has registered other generic
names, and what the domain name is used for (a respondent is likely to have a
right if it uses <apple.com> for a site for apples but not if the site is aimed at
selling computers or pornography).
Id. "However: If a respondent is using a generic word to describe his product/business or to profit
from the generic value of the word without intending to take advantage of complainant's rights in
that word, then it has a legitimate interest." Id.
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misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service
mark at issue.
18 7
However, UDRP Policy 4(c) has proven somewhat challenging for parties
to UDRP proceedings, particularly those from the United States, as
decisions under this requirement "have been less congruent with U.S.
law."' 88 The most likely reason for this dissonance is that all three UDRP
Policy 4(c) defenses invoke some analysis of "fair use," a concept that
varies from country to country, 89 and even within the United States.
I1. SITUATING CYBERSQUATTING AMONG TRADEMARK PRINCIPLES
There is no question that the remedial structures and substantive
regulations applied to cybersquatting are founded - historically,
theoretically, and expressly - on the broad principles of trademark law.
However, cybersquatting is still a distinct "wrong" occurring in a unique
medium. Accordingly, the statutory and private arbitration regimes that
have been created to address cybersquatting have modified both basic
tenets and particular aspects of trademark law. However, altering these
elements to resolve a specific problem conceptually linked to trademarks
does not necessarily implicate identical rights and interests. This section
of the Article seeks to situate cybersquatting rules and remedies among
trademark principles, illuminating distinctions that, as I will discuss in Part
IV, have in some degree expanded beyond the justifications upon which
such distinctions were based, without adequate regard for foundational
differences.
A. Toward Property: Theoretical Evolution in Trademark Law
The particulars of trademark law are certainly more than theoretical,
but it is one area of law in which the theoretical battle has been
uncommonly visible. Broadly speaking, one side of the debate conceives
of trademarks as private property, with an expansive bundle of exclusive
rights attendant to such ownership.190 The other regards trademarks as an
187. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(c).
188. Hampton & McCue, supra note 31, at 23.
189. Id. See also WIPO Overview, supra note 135, Questions 2.4, 2.5.
190. See, e.g., Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous"
Trademarks: Anti-Competitive "Monopoly" or Earned "Property'" Right?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 653,
683-97 (1995) (making the argument that trademarks entail an earned property right). See also
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP.
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artificial monopoly in expression, to be avoided, constrained, or
minimized.' 9' This argument is more than academic, as one's
understanding of the rights and restrictions encompassed within trademark
protections may be strongly influenced by the theoretical principles to
which one ascribes. Not surprisingly, the development of trademarks, and
the legal protection afforded to them, embodies a certain ebb-and-flow
between these viewpoints.
Modem trademark protections are rooted in the common law tort of
deception through misrepresentation as to the source of goods, and thus
their content, quality, warranty, etc.' 92 Consistent with this action, common
law trademark rights are premised on use in commerce and a particular
conception of reputation.'93 The mark serves both as an indicator of
source 194 and as shorthand for all of the information that consumers might
read into that identification, such as quality, utility, mode of manufacture,
and the like. 95 Thus, the mark, when sufficiently unique, embodies the
producer's reputation and, where customers are happy, the goodwill that
the producer's reputation has created. This, in turn, gives value to the
mark, protecting both producers from diversion of trade and consumers
from receiving a lesser good or service than expected.
Common law trademark rights are, as a practical matter, limited
geographically. Such a mark carries trademark significance only in the
geographic area in which consumers recognize it as an indication of
source. Indeed, for many early marks, geographic identification was an
integral part of the information conveyed by the trademark. Accordingly,
identical or similar marks could co-exist in distinct geographic markets
without undermining their trademark significance.
As trademark law progressed towards a federal system of rights
recognition, the debate over its theoretical bases accelerated. Proponents
of expansive trademark protections urged a full embrace of the private
267 (1988) (providing an economic analysis and justification for the recognition of property-like
trademark rights).
191. See, e.g., Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History
of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 306 (1979) (describing the monopoly view of
trademarks); Rose, supra note 190, at 664-73 (providing a skeptic's overview of intellectual
property rights, including trademark rights, as anti-competitive monopolies).
192. McClure, supra note 191, at 314-16 (describing the early development of trademark law
in America).
193. Landes & Posner, supra note 190, at 272, 279-80.
194. Rose, supra note 190, at 658 (describing a process by which trademarks "become source
identifiers").
195. Id. (arguing that trademarks also serve as "indicators of quality assurance and advertising
power").
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property conception, replete with all of the positive imagery that such an
idealized vision evokes - the incentive to create, natural rights in the fruit
of one's labor, and the social utility of highest and best use. 96 Critics, on
the other hand, continued to press the concept of trademarks as a
monopoly, and thus an evil to be tolerated only to the extent necessary to
serve a specific set of social benefits related to consumer protection and
economic efficiency. 97 In the end, it seemed that under the fairly narrow
terms of the Lanham Act the monopoly view had largely, if not entirely,
prevailed. However, the act instead proved to be a useful baseline against
which to leverage future movement toward a property conception.
Indeed, since the passage of the Lanham Act, legal institutions have
methodically expanded the boundaries of trademark protections. We have
seen a broadening not only in the scope of protectable trademark subject
matter, but also in the private rights incumbent in that protection. Not
surprisingly, this expansion has met with some resistance. But the vagaries
of common law and statutory language, and the particularly complex
interplay between these authorities as they exist in trademark law, have
proven amply flexible to accommodate reinterpretation. With the
theoretical foundations of trademark protection (whether monopoly- or
property-based) seemingly unmoored, the substantive boundaries of that
protection have tended to expand from the relatively narrow grant
embodied in the Lanham Act to more substantial rights paralleling those
associated with traditional private property. Indeed, it can be persuasively
argued that our legal institutions now generally embrace a view of
trademark protection in which the bundle of rights held by the trademark
proprietor is so broad as to nearly evoke Blackstone's traditional view of
the real property owner.
This expansion,justified within the traditional likelihood-of-confusion
framework, is well documented, and need not be reviewed in great detail.
The first area of expansion has been in the area of subject matter. Seizing
on a broad statutory definition of a trademark that includes any
"device,"' 198 courts have moved well beyond words and pedestrian symbols
to discern a broad universe of things that can qualify as a trademark -
including slogans, trade dress, shape, color, design, and configuration. A
second area of expansion has been the broadening of infringement beyond
the deception-based fraud of passing off one's own goods or services for
those of another, where the harm is primarily to the consumer, to include
free-riding on the goodwill of another, where the harm is primarily to the
196. See generally Rose, supra note 190, at 672.
197. See generally McClure, supra note 191, at 306.
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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trademark holder. A third area of expansion has been to extend the
trademark holder's rights to include protection not just from goods or
services that are directly competitive, but also from goods or services that
are closely related to those of the trademark holder. A fourth area of
expansion (and this list is certainly not exhaustive) has been to broaden the
concept of what "confusion" trademark protections are intended to avoid.
Rather than limiting protection to instances of confusion over source,
courts have found infringement where the confusion is said to implicate
sponsorship, endorsement, or affiliation. The concept has been further
expanded by the recognition by many Circuits of the doctrine of "initial
interest confusion."'99 This doctrine allows a trademark holder to stop
competitors from attracting a consumer's attention by use of another's
trademark, even where there is no likelihood of confusion; i.e., any
confusion would be cleared up quickly, prior to purchase.
Each of these new areas of protection - each new stick in the bundle
of trademark rights - pushes trademarks closer to our conception of
private property. As the number of uses from which the trademark holder
may exclude all others grows, we arguably approach an image of exclusive
dominion. As we provide greater protections against private harm rather
than to promote the public benefit, we move away from expressive
monopoly concerns and toward property rights. Furthermore, as source
confusion is eclipsed by the trademark holder's right to remedy any
possible confusion as to the existence of any connection between the
trademark owner and the goods, services, or expressive acts of another, we
seem ready to jettison the idea of a limited monopoly altogether.
With the addition of the federal dilution statute in § 43(c) of the
Lanham Act,2"' the movement toward property rights has taken a
tremendous leap forward, at least for a few chosen marks. Section 43(c)
codified the extension of trademark rights (in the case of "famous" and
"distinctive" marks) beyond mere protection against customer confusion
to the reputation of the mark itself. Accordingly, dilution has been
described as "the gradual 'whittling away' of a trademark's value, 2 1
usually in one of two forms: blurring or tarnishment. °2 Furthermore, a
199. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1999).
201. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
202. Id. But see Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003) (raising the
question of whether blurring and tarnishment are truly embraced by the FTDA, but without
addressing it).
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§ 43(c) claim does not require that the plaintiff show competition between
the goods or services in question. °3 Nor must the plaintiff show a
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.20 4
As a result, § 43(c) expressly extends trademark protections beyond the
narrow confines of source confusion; unjustified by a reduction in search
costs, informational efficiency, or related economic considerations. The
Supreme Court itself has recognized that "[u]nlike traditional infringement
law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not.., motivated by
an interest in protecting consumers. 20 5 Indeed, dilution expressly frees
trademarks from the quid pro quo implicit in the monopoly-based theory
of the original Lanham Act. In so doing, § 43(c) seems to at least approach
property-like trademark rights in gross. This solidifies the argument that
trademark rights are no longer entirely confined by the monopoly
rationale, if they ever were, but should instead be read broadly to embrace
the romantic vision of economic efficiency, progress, and just rewards
embodied in private property.
This is not to say that these rights are unlimited. In addition to those
constraints apparent in the terms of the infringement and/or dilution
statutes - likelihood of confusion, commercial use, fame and
distinctiveness, bad faith, etc. - the Lanham Act incorporates an express
statutory grant of fair use. Moreover, the act is subject to limitations of
constitutional fair use. These restrictions are integral to the balance
between private and public rights in expression. Certainly, recent
developments in trademark law have appropriated specific, additional
rights from the public and allocated them to private interests but these
encroachments have not yet eviscerated many of the most important
limitations.
Blurring involves a diminution in the uniqueness or individuality of a mark
because of its use on unrelated goods. Tarnishing occurs when a trademark is
linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or
unsavory context, with the result that the public will associate the lack of quality
or lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiff's unrelated goods.
Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477,489 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotes and
citations omitted).
203. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 429. See also Holstein-Childress, supra note 31, at 576 (noting that the federal
dilution statutes embody a "shift to a property-based trademark protection regime that primarily
values the marketing function of trademarks - free of any constraint posed by the consumer
confusion-based theories").
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B. Cybersquatting as a Point of Expansion
Trademark law has clearly evolved towards an expansive, property-like
conception of exclusive rights. Yet even this broad protection seemed
insufficient to solve the particular problem of cybersquatting. As such, the
remedial systems developed to address cybersquatting imbued trademark
holders with the additional rights they needed to secure their interests in
domain names. Many of these changes chaff under our traditional view of
trademarks, but have been largely excused as a narrow, if somewhat
drastic, response to a specific and intentional wrong. The question seems
to be whether these expansions now exceed their supporting rationales.
1. Expansion within the Substantive Terms of the ACPA
The ACPA expands the trademark holder's rights in significant ways.
It mirrors and in some cases moves beyond the additional protections
provided in the federal dilution statute (§ 43(c) of the Lanham Act), and
closer to an exclusive property rights conception in the context of domain
names. As with § 43(c), the ACPA applies without regard to the goods or
services of the parties.2 °6 Unlike § 43(c), however, the ACPA is not limited
to marks that are both famous and distinctive," 7 but applies to a much
broader universe of marks that are either famous or distinctive. The ACPA
also eliminates20 8 the use-in-commerce and commercial-use requirements
of § 43(c). 2 °9 Finally, the ACPA redirects the substantive inquiry from the
issue of the mark's capacity to identify and distinguish goods and
services,"' to a showing of mark identity (i.e., identical or confusingly
similar)21' plus bad faith.21 2 This effectively narrows the multi-factored
confusion standard to two primary inquiries, thus broadening the
trademark holder's rights. This expansion is reflected in Congress's
express recognition of the need for protection extending beyond diversion
of trade by a competitor, to the protection of a company's goodwill from
even the slightest injury, separate and apart from any concern over
213
consumer protection.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (1999).
207. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127(c)(1) (2000) (regarding application of the federal dilution statute
only to marks that are famous and distinctive).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (II).
209. Seegenerallyid. § 1125(d).
210. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (II).
212. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
213. See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(V); supra Part II(C)(2)(a) (addressing conceptions of
cybersquatting).
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The ACPA factors for evidence of bad faith, which center on the intent
of financial gain, 21 4 together with the elimination of the use-in-commerce
and commercial-use requirements,25 would certainly rile Internet
exceptionalists. 2 6 Their speculation and foresight would now be labeled
as trespass; their claims of a new territory apart from existing off-line
power structures, rights, and obligations, would be rejected. Nevertheless,
if this is where we left it, that result might at least be defensible in terms
of trademark law. The ACPA was seen as a rational and targeted response
to a perceived wrong narrowly tailored to resolve that problem through the
protection of established interests in a new but familiar medium (and not
a newly created, self-governing territory), informed by existing principles
and analogous precedent, subject to procedural due process, and limited
by both statutory and constitutional concepts of fair use. As such, the
ACPA's approach to domain name rights and dispute resolution might
well have settled comfortably into the landscape of trademark law, but the
UDRP is an entirely different story.
2. Expansion within the Substantive Terms of the UDRP
For purposes of this analysis, it is necessary to note that the UDRP
differs substantively from the ACPA in at least three important areas in
addition to the vastly expanded rights already conferred under the federal
dilution statute and the ACPA.21 7 The first relates to the standard of bad
faith and the way in which it is applied. The second relates to the
relationship between the bad faith standard and the defenses of
noncommercial and fair use, and particularly the availability of those
defenses where there exists an intent for commercial gain or to tarnish the
mark of another. This point also implicates the ACPA's distinct limitation
on when one's intent for commercial gain or tarnishment may be
considered, and the absence of such limitation in the UDRP. The third
involves the presence of an express safe-harbor provision for "innocent"
actors.
The ACPA focuses on a registrant's bad faith intent to profit.218 In
determining whether that standard has been met, the ACPA provides a list
of nine non-mandatory, non-exhaustive factors to be considered. 219 These
factors expressly balance the registrant's bona fide interest in the domain
214. See supra Part II(C)(2)(b) (addressing bad faith).
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
216. See supra Part I.
217. See supra Parts l1(C)(1)-(2), 111(A), III(B)(1).
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i); supra Part II(C)(2)(b).
219. See supra Part II(C)(1)(b) (discussing bad faith).
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name, both commercial and noncommercial,220 with evidence of bad faith
intent to profit or otherwise harm the trademark holder.221 In contrast, the
UDRP avoids any type of balancing test, instead providing four
independent bases for a finding of bad faith.222 Any one of these bases,
standing alone, may be sufficient to satisfy UDRP Policy 4(c).223 If the
complainant is successful in establishing a prima facie case on any one of
these bases, the burden shifts to the registrant to prove that he has rights
to and a legitimate interest in the domain name.224 The ACPA's balancing
approach is more consistent with American trademark law,225 while the
UDRP clearly shifts the balance of rights toward the trademark holder.
As part of the ACPA's balancing approach to bad faith, § 43(d)
indicates that the court should consider, inter alia, the registrant's "bona
fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the
domain name" 226 in determining whether such bad faith exists. This factor
stands alone as one of the nine to be considered in making a determination
as to bad faith, with no qualification of its applicability. Similarly, the
UDRP allows the registrant to demonstrate his rights or interests in the
domain name by showing that he is "making a legitimate noncommercial
or fair use of the domain name., 227 However, the UDRP places a
significant qualifier on this defense by linking it to evidence of bad faith.
Under the UDRP, such use must be made "without intent for commercial
gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or
service mark at issue. 228 Examining the four circumstances evidencing
bad faith under the terms of the UDRP,229 it becomes clear that this
qualifier all but swallows the defense.
This distinction is even more pronounced when one considers the
limitation the ACPA places on a court's consideration of the registrant's
intent for commercial gain or to tarnish. The ACPA provides that evidence
of bad faith may include the registrant's
220. See generally id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(d)(1)(A)(i); supra Part II(C)(2)(b).
221. See supra Part II(C)(1)(b); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
222. See supra Part II(C)(3); UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(b).
223. See supra Part II(C)(3) (discussing controversy over the interpretation of UDRP Policy
4(c)).
224. See supra Part lI(C)(2)(a) (discussing controversy regarding shifting burdens of proof
under the UDRP Policy).
225. See generally Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1981); AMF,
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 579 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(d)(l)(B)(i)(IV) (1999).
227. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(c)(iii).
228. Id.
229. Id. 4(b).
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intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to
a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or
with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a
likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site.... 23o
Thus, absent this connection between the registrant's bad intent and the
creation of a genuine likelihood of confusion, this factor should not be
considered. The UDRP contains no such limitation,23' further broadening
the impact of its qualification on the registrant's noncommercial or fair use
defense and effectively expanding the rights of the trademark holder once
again.
Given the UDRP's one-strike approach to bad faith and significant
limitations on the noncommercial or fair use defenses, one might expect
the UDRP to provide an express, independent safe-harbor provision for
"innocent" actors outside the intended reach of an anti-cybersquatting
regime. However, no such provision is provided. The ACPA, by
comparison, provides that the "[b]ad faith intent described under
subparagraph (A) shall not be found in any case in which the court
determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe
that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful. 232
Thus, in addition to providing a balancing approach more akin to
American trademark law, as well as an unqualified consideration of a
registrant's noncommercial or fair use, the ACPA also provides a safe
harbor for "innocent" registrants, focusing the applicability of ACPA
narrowly on the most egregious cases of bad intent.
Finally, the UDRP's radical expansion of the trademark holder's
substantive rights in domain names is further exacerbated by the extension
of these rights to almost any mark. As discussed above, the expanded
protections of the federal dilution statute are limited to marks that are both
famous and distinctive, 33 while the even broader protections of the ACPA
are limited to marks that are either famous or distinctive.234 The UDRP, on
the other hand, applies without regard to the strength of the mark.235 Thus,
230. 15 U.S.C. § I125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (emphasis added).
231. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(c)(iii).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
233. Id. § 1125(c)(I).
234. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
235. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(a).
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all marks - famous or not, distinctive or not - are provided with the
"tarnishment" exception to the noncommercial and fair use defenses.
236
3. Systemic Expansion Beyond Substantive Terms
The extension of trademark rights under the UDRP is further amplified
when the Policy's substantive expansions are leveraged against procedural
and institutional biases in favor of the trademark holder. On the procedural
side, the UDRP imposes unreasonable time limits, provides no real
opportunity for appeal, and fails to sanction over-aggressive enforcement
actions undertaken by trademark holders to intimidate registrants.
Moreover, the process lacks transparency and provides little in the way of
clear principles or standards to govern decisions. There is also a credible
institutional argument that the UDRP system is set up, and the service
providers selected, so that it favors trademark holders. Indeed, the numbers
appear to demonstrate this.
Procedural biases are apparent from the outset of a UDRP action. The
complainant trademark holder has nearly unlimited time to prepare her
case before the filing of a UDRP complaint. In contrast, the registrant has
just twenty days to prepare his response.237 Furthermore, these are
generally the only documents considered by the panel, although the parties
may request supplemental filings.238 Hearings are extremely rare.239 In
most cases, the panel is given just fourteen days to reach its decision.240
Following that decision (which, as discussed below, is most likely to go
against the registrant), the losing party has just ten days to seek relief from
a court of competent jurisdiction before the panel's decision to cancel or
transfer the domain name takes effect.24 1 In all, the entire process can take
just a few weeks; barely enough time for a registrant to seek legal
assistance, much less produce an adequate defense. Moreover, there is
little or no penalty under the UDRP for the over-aggressive use of UDRP
processes to gain control of domain names from legitimate owners, a ploy
236. See supra Part II(C)(3)(b).
237. UDRP Rules, supra note 126, § 5(a); See also id. § 5(d) (providing, in part, that "At the
request of the Respondent, the Provider may, in exceptional cases, extend the period of time for the
filing of the response.").
238. Id. § 12 (providing that "In addition to the complaint and the response, the Panel may
request, in its sole discretion, further statements or documents from either of the Parties.").
239. Id. § 13 (providing that "There shall be no in-person hearings ... unless the Panel
determines, in its sole discretion and as an exceptional matter, that such a hearing is necessary for
deciding the complaint").
240. Id. § 15(b).
241. UDRP Policy, supra note 11, 4(k).
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known as "reverse domain name hijacking," even in clear cases of bad
faith. Finally, there is no real opportunity for appeal, other than through a
time-consuming and expensive court proceeding filed within the ten-day
period provided for under the UDRP.
The available evidence also suggests that an institutional bias in favor
of trademark holders may also exist. Procedurally, the UDRP places the
choice of provider in the hands of the complainant,242 who, by definition,
holds the rights to a trademark that is allegedly identical or confusingly
similar to the domain name in question.2 43 Approved UDRP providers are
thus competing against one another for the provision of services to
trademark holders, many of whom own the rights to multiple trademarks
and will therefore likely require future services. This economic reality
creates a strong incentive for UDRP providers to render decisions that
favor trademark holders. Not surprisingly, the two dominant UDRP
providers, WIPO and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), are both seen
as favoring strong intellectual property rights.
Available statistics regarding the outcome of UDRP proceedings
support this view. As of May 2004, over eighty percent of the nearly eight
thousand proceedings disposed of by decision had favored the
complainant, resulting in cancellation or transfer to the trademark
holder.24 4 Less than twenty percent of the proceedings had resulted in a
decision for the registrant.2 45 The remaining one percent had resulted in a
split decision. 246 Broken down by the number of domain names at issue,
rather than the overall proceeding, these numbers favor the trademark
holders to an even greater extent. Of the more than thirteen thousand
domain names at issue, eighty-one percent were cancelled or transferred
to the trademark holder.247 Approximately fourteen percent were retained
by the registrant.24' The remaining five percent were split decisions. 249 It
is telling that complainants were significantly more successful in UDRP
242. Id. 4(d); id. 3.
243. Id. 4(a)(i).
244. ICANN Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, as of May 10, 2004, [hereinafter ICANN Statistical Summary] at http://www.
icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005) (indicating 6262 out of 7790
decisions, or 80.4%).
245. Id. (indicating 1468 out of 7790 decisions, or 18.8%).
246. Id. (indicating 60 out of 7790 decisions, or 0.8%).
247. Id. (indicating 10,719 out of 13,311 domain names, or 81.5%).
248. Id. (indicating 1,892 out of 13,311 domain names, or 14.2%).
249. ICANN Statistical Summary, supra note 244 (indicating 640 out of 13311 domain names,
or 4.8%).
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actions undertaken by eResolutions, the third most popular provider, and
eResolutions is now out of business.25°
IV. BEYOND PROPERTY? LOSING TOUCH WITH LIMITING PRINCIPLES
The issues coming out of this expansion of trademark holder rights in
the context of domain name disputes are whether and to what extent these
additional rights can be squared with the foundational principles upon
which they were constructed. That foundation rests upon two pillars. The
first is a product of practical concerns and competing interests which were
found to justify the alteration of certain tenets of trademark protection for
the purpose of addressing the very specific and perceptually grave harm
of cybersquatting. The second is composed of theoretical justifications for
the expansion of trademark protections toward a private property-like
conception of broad exclusive rights, but limited by basic constitutional
interests.
In this final section of this Article, I will argue that the UDRP dispute
resolution system has lost touch with the basic principles which support it.
The UDRP was intended to strike a bargain, sacrificing certain due process
protections in favor of efficiency, speed, and reduced costs. Because of
this, the UDRP was in theory to be sharply limited, applicable only to the
most obvious and egregious cases of bad faith and abusive domain name
registration. In substance and practice, however, UDRP panels have in
essence grossly exceeded their intended jurisdiction. The result is a
dramatic shift in favor of the trademark holder, creating through seizure
and reallocation some sort of absolute right beyond property. Not only
have protections outstripped the rationales of consumer protection and
preservation of goodwill, they have arguably invaded constitutional
interests.
A. Beyond Cybersquatting Exceptionalism
The ACPA provides a useful baseline, as it is intended to apply to a
fairly broad but defensible conception ofcybersquatting 1 Included in this
conception is what might be referred to as "classic" cybersquatting, in
which the registrant intends to profit monetarily through arbitrage (or
blackmail) by selling the domain name to the highest bidder, whether that
be the owner of an identical or similar trademark, or his competitor.2 52
250. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 142, at 335.
251. See supra Part II(C)(2)(a).
252. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999).
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Another form of cybersquatting seeks to deceive consumers in such a way
that they purchase counterfeit goods thinking that they are the real thing.253
A third form of cybersquatting involves the registration of domain names
identical or similar to well-known marks, leveraging consumer confusion
and free-riding on the mark's goodwill so as to divert traffic or trade.254 In
essence, the ACPA defines cybersquatting by the egregiousness of the
registrant's conduct and objective, focusing on his bad faith intent to profit
through commercial gain.
On its face, as it defines "bad faith," the UDRP at first appears
consistent with this rather limited universe of circumstances. 255 However,
expansive interpretation by UDRP panels has stretched its application far
beyond any recognizable conception of intentional, greed driven, bad faith
cybersquatting. UDRP panels have found evidence of bad faith in, inter
alia, non-use or the absence of legitimate use, the provision of anonymous
or false contact information, the failure to perform a trademark search, or
the mere registration of a well-known mark.256 Such evidence simply
cannot be matched to any of the offensive conduct that anti-cybersquatting
regimes seek to remedy and deter.
This expansion of the bad-faith concept might itself have a nominal
impact if the UDRP provided for and effectively applied a sufficiently
robust counterbalance. Unfortunately, the availability of a noncommercial
or fair-use defense has been minimized, particularly by its qualification
where tamishment is found and the failure to require likelihood of
confusion as a prerequisite for tarnishment. Not only does this fail to
provide an adequate balance to bad faith; it effectively broadens the
conception of cybersquatting even further. Likewise, the absence of an
express safe harbor provision for innocent actors is particularly telling,
given the regime's intended focus on egregious conduct.
The impact of this overbreadth is not limited to mere labels. Both the
ACPA and, to an even greater extent, the UDRP were intended to broaden
the trademark holder's rights, starting with the federal dilution statute as
a baseline and expanding certain aspects of protection to address a specific
problem. Outside the strict confines of cybersquatting, those expanded
rights simply do not make sense.
Trademark protections have been traditionally rationalized on the basis
of consumer protection and economic efficiency. 7 These rationales
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See supra Part II(C)(3)(b).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 174-81.
257. See supra Part 111(A).
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extend from the trademark's function as an indication of source,
sponsorship, endorsement, or affiliation. Their premise is that through
experience with the product or service, consumers instill the trademark
with information about its content, quality, utility, etc., even if the product
or service is not identical to that with which the consumer has previous
experience. This communication of desirable but obscure information is
what creates economic efficiencies through, among other things, the
reduction of search costs. It also benefits consumers by motivating
trademark holders to maintain and improve quality of their goods and
services. Trademark holders are in turn benefited by the trademark's
protection against diversion of trade. More recently, expanded trademark
protections have been premised on the maintenance of goodwill,
independent of any customer confusion. This implicates several private
interests, including protection of the mark against tarnishment or blurring
and punishment of improper free-riding. Implicit in these private interests,
however, is the perceived public benefit that flows from the incentive to
invest in one's reputation.
The current application of the UDRP cannot be justified under even the
most expansive view of trademark rights. There is no rationale, for
instance, for the extension of dilution-based rights to trademarks that are
neither famous nor distinctive. And there is certainly no rationale for
limiting the noncommercial and fair use defenses because of the
tarnishment of these pedestrian marks.
B. In Derogation of Constitutional Interests and the Rule of Law
The UDRP requires us to sacrifice quite a bit in exchange for
efficiency, speed, and ease. This bargain may have made sense when
narrowly tailored to a specific and serious problem, but in light of the
UDRP's expansion into more benign instances of domain name conflict,
that bargain needs to be reexamined. Due process concerns and notions of
fairness require transparency, consistency, and equal treatment. The rule
of law requires a measure of certainty such that one can be guided in his
actions and secure in his rights and obligations. As it is now interpreted
and applied, the UDRP dispute resolution policy fails to meet these
standards.
All domain name registrants are bound to the UDRP system. UDRP
panels are not required to apply a particular substantive law, nor are they
bound by precedent. There is little transparency and great uncertainty.
Moreover, the system is rife with procedural and institutional biases
favoring trademark holders. There is little opportunity for defense of one's
position and the practical ability for a meaningful appeal is limited. There
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is no sanction for actions brought in bad faith. In all, domain name
registrants are at the mercy of a system created to benefit trademark
holders not only as a matter of systemic efficiency but in result as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Any newcomers to the process of domain name dispute resolution as
well as general practitioners are likely a bit shocked at what they have
read. Arbitration-based systems like the UDRP are touted as efficient, fast,
and fair. But to whom? Both as a matter of substance and procedure, the
UDRP expands trademark-holder rights even beyond the broad property-
like rights emerging under U.S. trademark law. These expansions have
been reinforced by institutional biases in favor of trademark holders. As
a result, cybersquatting protections have exceeded the very rationale of
exceptionalism justifying their creation. The bargain at the heart of these
policies - premised on a narrow application to the most obvious and
egregious cases of bad faith - is no longer supported. As such, the
validity of the UDRP as it is now applied is in doubt.
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